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RECONCILIATION THROUGH A JUDICIAL LENS: COMPETING
LEGITIMATION FRAMEWORKS IN THE ICTY's PLAVSIC AND BABIC-
JUDGMENTS
KERSTIN BREE CARLSON*
I came [before the ICTY] for two reasons: To confront these charges
and to spare my people, for it was clear that they would pay the price of
any refusal to come.... I have now come to the belief and accept the
fact that many thousands of innocent people were the victims of an
organized, systematic effort to remove Muslims and Croats from the
territory claimed by Serbs.
Biljana Plavgid addressing Tribunal at her Sentencing Hearing
i
I come before this Tribunal with a deep sense of shame and remorse. I
have allowed myself to take part in the worst kind of persecution of
people simply because they were Croats and not Serbs. Innocent people
were persecuted; innocent people were evicted forcibly from their
houses; and innocent people were killed. Even when I learned what had
happened, I kept silent. Even worse, I continued in my office, and I
became personally responsible for the inhumane treatment of innocent
people.
Milan Babid addressing Tribunal while entering his plea of guilty
2
With respect to [Plav§iW's and Babi's] role, various degrees of
responsibility, in paragraph 1 of the Plavgid judgment, the Court found
that she embraced and supported the objective of ethnic cleansing. I
guess Mr. Babid did, but not in exactly the same way and under the
*JD, PhD, Postdoctoral Researcher, iCourts, The University of Copenhagen; Assistant Professor, The
American University of Paris. This research is funded by the Danish National Research Foundation
Grant no. DNRF105 and conducted under the auspices of iCourts, the Danish National Research
Foundation's Centre of Excellence for International Courts. The author thanks Marianne Constable,
Susan Perry, colleagues at iCourts' "Science BBQ" and students at The American University of Paris
for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Prosecutor v. Plavgid, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing 609
(Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/trans/en/0212171T.htm [hereinafter Plavgid Dec. 17 Sentencing
Hearing Transcript].
2. Prosecutor v. Babid, Case No. IT-03-72, Transcript of Plea Hearing 57 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 27, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/trans/en/0401271A.htm
[hereinafter Babi6 Jan. 27 Plea Hearing Transcript].
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same circumstances. And I don't know how to articulate that any better,
but I think that the Tribunal ought to have a sense of that at this point.
Counsel for Milan Babi6 addressing Tribunal in Sentencing Hearing
3
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Biljana Plavgi6, former Bosnian Serb president, held her nose and
pled guilty to the "persecutions" of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims before
the UN ad hoc tribunal constructed to adjudicate crimes resulting from
Yugoslavia's violent dissolution ("ICTY").4 International luminaries including
Madeleine Albright and Elie Weisel testified at her sentencing hearing on the
importance of her gesture for "the victims" and "for humanity,5 as well as its
significance for reconciliation and peace.6 The Plavgi indictment described more
than a hundred criminal incidents, which claimed more than 50,000 lives and
destroyed at least 830 villages;7 Plavgir's address to the Tribunal, however,
contained no specific acknowledgment of the scale of this suffering or her role in
perpetrating it, and instead reiterated the nationalist arguments that underwrote the
violence her plea acknowledged.8  Regardless, the Tribunal noted the "courage"
that Plavgi's acknowledgement of violence represented,9 accepted her statement
as "an expression of remorse"'0 with the possibility to "promote reconciliation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole"'1 and sentenced her to 11
years' imprisonment. 12
One year later, Milan Babik, former president of the Serb "break-away"
republic that controlled vast tracts of Croatian territory between 1991-1995, pled
guilty to persecutions that claimed the lives of 230 people.13 Although not under
3. Prosecutor v. Babi, Case No. IT-03-72, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing 242 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 2, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/trans/en/040402SE.htm [hereinafter Babi6 Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing
Transcript].
4. Prosecutor v. Plavti6, Case No. IT-00-39&40/l-S, Amended Consolidated Indictment (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 7, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/ind/en/kra-
cai0203O7e.pdf [hereinafter Plav~i6 Indictment]; see also Prosecutor v. Plavgid, Case No. IT-00-
39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment 1 5 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf [hereinafter Plavgid Judgment].
5. Plavid Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1, at 497.
6. See id.
7. See Plavgid Indictment, supra note 4; see also id. at Schedule A-Schedule B.
8. Plavgi6 Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1, at 609 1. 4, 612 1. 21.
Notwithstanding its content, her intervention and plea of guilty was globally received as a sincere
expression of remorse.
9. See Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4, 73.
10. Id. 77 (quoting the language of prosecution witness Mirsad Toka~a.)
11. Id. 80.
12. This sentence is significantly lower than the fifteen to twenty-five years recommended by the
Prosecutor's Office ("OTP"), especially when considered in light of how long she actually served (six
years, because convicted defendants come up for early release after serving 2/3 of their sentences in
European jails). See Plavgi6 Judgment, supra note 4, 1 128.
13. Prosecutor v. Babid, Case No. IT-03-72, Sentencing Judgment 11 14-19 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
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investigation by the ICTY, Babic surrendered himself to the Tribunal when he
learned his name had been mentioned within the Milogevi& indictment. 14 Securing
no immunity,15 Babi cooperated "extensively" with the Prosecutor's Office
("OTP") 6 "at great danger to his family and his own personal safety;"'17 the
material he provided would later form the basis of his own indictment and
conviction. Yet the Babi Sentencing Chamber, unique among all plea bargain
cases, issued a sentence in excess of that requested by the OTP (in Babi6's case,
thirteen years instead of the less than eleven recommended by the OTP); and in its
judgment, the Tribunal chastised Babi6 for "[h]is lack of moral strength [which]
prevented him from standing against injustice" and for insufficiently
acknowledging "the full significance of the role he played in Croatia in that
period."'
' 8
The issue presented is how to make sense of these two judgments. At one
level, they are relatively congruent: two senior (although politically
marginalized)19 ethnic Serb leaders, both pleading guilty, both receiving similar
sentences. The facts of the cases, the profiles of the two defendants, and the
the Former Yugoslavia June 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/casesfbabic/tjug/en/bab-sj040629e.pdf
[hereinafter Babi6 Sentencing Judgment];
Babid Jan. 27 Plea Hearing Transcript supra note 2, 54-55; Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72,
Joint Motion for Consideration of a Plea Agreement between Milan Babi and the Office of the
Prosecutor IM 1-4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2004).
14. Babid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 2.
15. Other defendants have secured significant immunity at the Tribunal. For example, Miroslav
Deronji6 worked extensively with OTP in exchange for a limited indictment that only referenced his
participation in the destruction of one village in eastern Bosnia, and omitted other instances of
participation, including in the planning and perpetration of the massacre at Srebrenica. Judge
Schomburg wrote a blistering dissent vigorously protested promises in this regard made by the
Prosecutor. Prosecutor v. Deronji, Case No. IT-02-61, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfgang
Schomburg 11 6-16 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/deronjic/tjug/en/sj-040330e.pdf.
16. Babid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 74.
17. Id. (quoting the Prosecution Sentencing Brief 39).
18. Id. 1198.
19. Although both Plavgid and Babid were public figures occupying leadership positions, both of
them were largely figureheads. Plavi6 endorsed and encouraged the brutal nationalist measures of her
government, but the actual planners and architects of Bosnian violence were carried out by other
leaders, centrally Plavid's co-president Radovan Karadzi6, implementing policies generated by a circle
of leaders in Belgrade. See Marko Attila Hoare, Vindication or travesty ? Operation Storm 's Ante
Gotovina and Mladen Markac acquitted, THE GREATER SURBITION (November 19, 2012),
https://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/vindication-or-travesty-operation-storms-ante-
gotovina-and-mladen-markac-acquitted/ (arguing that there is a flawed construction of responsibility by
ICTY prosecutions, which insufficiently addressed how Bosnian violence was a Serbian brainchild).
Babi6 was de jure commander of Krajina's armed forces, but it is undisputed that actual control of
armed forces (some of whom went on to commit serious crimes against civilian populations) remained
throughout this time with Milan Martid and others. Martid was convicted of war crimes in connection
with the shelling of Zagreb and events in Krajina and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison, which was
upheld on appeal. Prosecutor v. Marti6, Case No. IT-95-11 Appeals Chamber Judgment 322 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia October 8, 2008); Prosecutor v. Martid, Case No. IT-95-11,
Judgment 519 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, June 12, 2007).
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Tribunal's construction of these profiles in juridical terms, however, reveal
important inconsistencies between the two cases. Biljana Plavi6, an ardent and
unrepentant nationalist, pled guilty to the destruction wrought by the politics she
advocated while vigorously reasserting nationalist rationales for such policies.
Unsurprisingly, she did not cooperate in any way with the OTP following her
sentencing, and she eventually recanted her admissions.20 Milan Babi6, on the
other hand, broke with Milogevi6 early in the war because of the latter's use of
violence and attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to work towards a political solution
for Krajina even as the war was waged. Following the war, he refused requests to
speak about his experiences designed to contribute to nationalist discourse.2' In
public testimony and unreservedly before the ICTY Prosecutor, Babi6 repented his
support for the politics of nationalism which had so disastrously impacted his
country. He cooperated extensively in five other cases before the ICTY before
committing suicide in his cell in 200522, the image of a man consumed.
These individual distinctions might be little more than colorful personal
histories but for the Tribunal's divergent treatment of the cases precisely as
regards their potential as reconciliatory instruments. In the Tribunal's treatment,
Plavgit's case epitomizes, "the most important sentencing hearing that is likely to
be conducted or has ever been conducted"23 because of the significance of her
admission in terms of "peace" and "reconciliation" in the former Yugoslavia.
24
For the Plavi6 Chamber, no recitation of fact proved capable of refuting the
narrative of Plavgi6 as an exemplary convert to liberalism, and the ICTY continued
to treat Plavgi6 as if she were performing this role even after she very publicly
stopped.25  Babi6's actual transformation from nationalist to committed liberal,
20. Margaretha Nordgren, Mitet Med Bijana Plavsic [Meeting with Biljana Plavsic], 2009 VI
(Swed.) http://vitidningen.episerverhotell.net/templates/PrintPage.aspx?id=10784 (accessed Sept. 1,
2015) ("Jag offrade mig sjalv. Jag har inte gjort nigot fel, men min advokat rAdde mig att erkanna
punkten brott mot manskligheten for att kunna kohandla om de andra talspunktema. Annars hade
ratteg~ngen pigftt i tre, tre och ett halvt fr. Det var for lding tid med tanke pA hur gammal jag tr!" ["I
sacrificed myself. I did nothing wrong, but my attorney advised me to recognize a crime against manity
to avoid the other charges. Otherwise the trial might have taken three, three and a half years. That was
too long given how old I am." (translation by author)].
21. Babic Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 188 (answering Judge Orie's
question regarding why he waited until 2001 to come forward, and not directly following the war.
Babi explained that he had been in too tenuous a situation as a refugee in Serbia to make public
statements, cited an example of declining to speak publicly in favor of a Serbian nationalist cause.).
22. Prosecutor v. BabiW, Case No. IT-03-72, Report to the President Death of Milan Babid, (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Form Yugoslavia June 8, 2006),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom2/en/p I 087-babicreport.pdf.
23. Prosecutor v. Plavgi6, Case No. IT-00-39&40/I-S, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing 639 I1.
23-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/trans/en/0212181T.htm [hereinafter Plavgid Dec. 18 Sentencing
Hearing Transcript] (quoting Mr. Pavich, counsel for the defense).
24. Id. at 369-78 (quoting Mrs. Del Ponte, Office of the Prosecutor).
25. Prosecutor v. Plavgid, Case No. IT-OO-39 & 40/I-ES, Decision of the President on the
Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs. Biljana Plavgid, (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/presdec/en/090914.pdf [hereinafter Plavgid Early Release Decision]
(describing Plavgid's rehabilitation).
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meanwhile, is discounted by a Chamber focused on his personal flaws
(specifically, the "ethno-egoism" and "vanity" which Babi explained kept him in
office even after he realized that the politics of nationalism would harm
civilians).26 For the Babik Chamber, no contextual explanation or action taken on
Babi 's part could inhibit the Tribunal from punishing him. In other words,
Plav§i6's case is construed as political by the Tribunal, whereas Babi's case
remains personal. Yet the content of Plavgi6 and Babir's two statements, as well
as their interactions with the Tribunal, suggest precisely the opposite: Plavgir's
remorse is always personally motivated, whereas Babi6 actively seeks a larger,
politically meaningful role for his interventions.
This article argues that the distinctions between the argument and outcomes in
the Plavgi6 and Babie judgments illustrate an unresolved theoretical problem
regarding the foundational legitimacy of trying individuals for collective crimes,
which is the enterprise of the expanding field of international criminal law
("ICL"). The article compares the Plavgi6 and Babie cases to illustrate that ICL
has not yet balanced its roots in international humanitarian law (where law is non-
derrogable, and legitimacy is based in natural law)27 with its rationale borrowed
from domestic criminal law 28 (where law is social control, and legitimacy derives
from its service to a sovereign).29 This imbalance, which can be demonstrated by
contrasting the diverging rationales expressed in the Plavki and Babie judgments,
forms the basis for the current crisis in ICL, which may have ramifications for the
recognition and protection of human rights more globally.
The article proceeds in four parts. Following the Introduction, Part II offers a
brief overview of the growth of ICL and contrasting arguments for its legitimacy.
Part III discusses the Plavi6 and Babie cases in greater detail, particularly with
regard to the practice of plea bargaining before the ICTY and the reception their
guilty pleas enjoyed before the two ICTY Sentencing Chambers. Part IV analyses
the incongruities in the Plavgi6 and Babi processes, tying the analytical diverges
26. Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 61.
27. See generally, JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 64-88
(1964); see Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional
Thought, 106 YALE L. J. 423, 423-57 (1996). See also Gfinther Teubner, Exogenous self-binding: How
national and international courts contribute to transnational constitutionalization, in
TRANSCONSTITUTIONALISM 1, 1-20 (Giancarlo Corsi, Elena Esposito and Alberto Febbrajo eds.,
forthcoming 2015); discussion in following sections.
28. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 4 (1990); see also Antonio
Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 2 (1998) [hereinafter Cassese 1998] (arguing that
international criminal law represents domestic criminal expectations on an international level);
discussion in following sections.
29. See, e.g., Paul Rock, Sociological Theories of Crime, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 51-77 (Mike Maguire, et al. eds., 2012) (discussing historical and contemporary theories
of crime and punishment); see also NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH 7 (1991) (linking moral
philosophers' ideas regarding punishment to modern practices); GARLAND, supra note 28; DAVID
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
(2001) (discussing theories and assumptions that structured criminal justice systems in U.S. and UK,
and contrasting with contemporary reality); discussion in following sections.
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and incongruities in the Plavgi6 and Babi6 cases to two competing rationales for
ICL legitimacy: Judith Sklar's narrative argument regarding the value of political
trials and its bases in natural law theory, and social control (namely deterrence/
retribution) rationales culled from criminal law theory..
II. CONSTRUCTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International criminal law ("ICL") is a product of World War II, where the
Allied powers began discussing what to do with their vanquished foes well before
the war's end. As early as 1942, the Soviets had raised the need to try "the
Hitlerite invaders and their accomplices for the crimes committed by them in the
occupied countries of Europe."30  The possibility of trying Nazi leaders as war
criminals enjoyed a sort of precedent: the Treaty of Versailles that concluded
World War I had condemned Germany for waging aggressive war and made
provisions for Allied war crimes trials.31 The alternative, of course, was execution;
Stalin reputedly estimated that executions of between 10-50,000 Germans would
be necessary.32 Though Churchill was said to be horrified by the scale of Stalin's
suggestion, the British also favored executing Nazi leaders, whose guilt was seen
as "simply too obvious" for a trial.33 Of course, execution did not rule out a trial
apparatus. When the Russians, Americans, and British met at Yalta in 1944 to
discuss the coming peace, Stalin reputedly told Churchill, "In the Soviet Union, we
never execute anyone without a trial" to which Churchill replied, "Of course, of
course. We should give them a trial first." 34 Even after agreeing to the trials
suggested by the U.S., the Russians wished for such trials to exist as an exceptional
law against the defeated. It was the U.S. that championed, "an episode that would
leave an enduring judicial monument, to mark a giant step in the growth of
international law." 35 Thus from its earliest formulations, the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg ("IMT") and the legal field it birthed were designed to
promote a political and ideological position, and situate the Allied powers as
progenitors and practitioners of this set of beliefs.
During the summer of 1945, a team of Allied jurists, led by U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Jackson, (who would go on to head up the Allied Prosecution)
drafted the Charter for the IMT, defining charges and proscribing defenses.36 In
response to concerns that retroactive application of newly minted laws contravened
rule-of-law maxims, Jackson assured U.S. President Truman that the tribunal
30. GEOFFREY ROBERTS, STALIN'S WARS: FROM WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR, 1939-1953 at 141
(2006).
31. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 104 (2000).
32. PRIT BUTTAR, BATTLEGROUND PRUSSIA: THE ASSAULT ON GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONT
1944-45 at 240 (2012).
33. DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL 9 (2001).
34. See Doug Linder, The Nuremberg Trials (2000)
http://Iaw2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nurembergaccount.html.
35. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 80 (1970).
36. Robert H. Jackson, The Avalon Project: Justice Jackson's Report to the President on
Atrocities and War Crimes, June 7, 1945, YALE LAW SCHOOL LAW LIBRARY,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt jackO1 .asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
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would "punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain
and have been so written in every civilized code."37 Under established principles
of international law, which had placed state sovereignty at its center, states'
treatment of their own citizens was not a topic for international law to address.
The central revolution of the IMT was challenging this formulation and making
individuals criminally liable for acts performed in service to their state.
The IMT defined four charges: 1) waging an aggressive war; 2) crimes
against humanity; 3) war crimes; and 4) conspiracy to commit the preceding three
crimes.38 Of these, however, only "war crimes" existed in any defined manner
prior to the Nuremberg trials; the other three were all without precedent in
international law.39 The Charter also addressed the question of possible defenses.
Defendants were not permitted to challenge "the Tribunal, its members [. . .] or
their alternates;'40 defendants did not enjoy immunity based on their official
position;4 1 and following orders was not a complete defense (though it might be
considered in mitigation of punishment).42 In its judgment, the Tribunal also
rejected attempts at using obedience to national law and lu quoque ("you too,"
which uses the examples of similar crimes committed by the other side to defend
the legitimacy of defendant's actions) by defendants.
43
As an ad hoc tribunal, limited in time and scope, the IMT was distinguishable
from domestic criminal institutions in a number of ways, from its novel procedure
to its international staff. Most significantly, the IMT was not charged with
punishing all crime or all crime of a particular character within a geographic or
temporal period, but rather with locating some - sometimes the worst, sometimes
not - perpetrators and establishing their guilt. At the IMT, the question of whom
would be indicted - whether (and which) politicians, military leaders, prominent
business people, cultural figures, and from which countries such defendants should
be drawn, was debated for months.44 The final list of entirely German indictees
represented a series of political compromises between the British, American,
French and Soviet powers behind the trials and was devised as representative of
German aggression and the evils of the Nazi regime, with a nod to political
practicality, namely who the Allied powers had in prison.4 5 In addition to the
37. Id.
38. U.N. Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 280 reprinted in The Avalon Project: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, YALE
LAW SCHOOL LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp [hereinafter IMT Charter].
39. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT:MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE
TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 14-16 (2001).
40. IMT Charter, supra note 38, at art. 3.
41. Id. at art. 7.
42. Id. at art. 8.
43. See I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, 171-341 (Int'l Military Tribunal
1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
44. DOUGLAS, supra note 39, at 11-2.
45. For example, Admiral Erich Rader (sentenced to life in prison by the IMT, released after nine
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twenty-four individuals indicted by the IMT, six Nazi organizations were
arraigned as well.4 6 This action, novel in the extreme, opened the possibility for
finding participants guilty by association and was developed in order to facilitate
later prosecutions, but was ultimately rejected in the Tribunal judgment.47
The Cold War interrupted the ICL project, and western triumph at the Cold
War's end re-energized the institutionalization of ICL.48 Violence in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda was answered by ad hoc tribunals constituted by the
United Nations in 1993 and 1994.4 9  The two decades that followed saw the
construction of several other ad hoc or hybrid tribunals.50  The Rome Statute, a
treaty defining a permanent international criminal court ("the ICC"), was
concluded in 199851 and the quorum necessary to institute the Court was speedily
achieved in only four years, astounding most observers.52 With the ICC's
founding in 2002, and its first verdict in 2012,53 ICL cannot be presented as an ad
hoc fad. Regardless of whether history judges it a success, the concept of
individual liability for breaches of ICL is an idea persisting throughout the 20th
century and positioned to try to define the 21st century.
years) and one of Goebbels's propaganda officials, Hans Fritsche (acquitted by the IMT), were included
in the indictment because they were in Soviet custody.
46. Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der
Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die
Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the "SS")
and including Der Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret
State Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP (commonly
known as the "SA"); and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces; see The
Avalon Project: Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Minutes of the Opening Session of the
Tribunal, at Berlin, 18 October 1945, YALE LAW SCHOOL LAW LIBRARY,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (The question as regards to these
organizations was whether they were criminal or not).
47. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 43, at 365-66 (describing the sentences of
the trial: twelve defendants, death; seven defendants, prison terms; three defendants, acquitted).
48. See Mark Goodale, Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the Local, in
THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 22 (Mark
Goodale & Sally Engle Merry, eds., 2007) (arguing that human rights emerged as a dominant ideology
in this interstitial period). See also KATHRYN SIKKINK, JUSTICE CASCADE (2011); SAMANTHA POWER,
A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA IN AN AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002).
49. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing ICTR); S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993)
(establishing ICTY).
50. Padraig McAuliffe, Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice's Golden
Child Became an Orphan, 7 J. INT'L L. & INT'L RELATIONS 1, 7 (2001) (explaining the establishment of
The Ad Hoc Tribunal for East Timor, Indonesia (2001), The Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), The
Extraordinary Cambers in the Courts of Cambodia (2003), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007) and
several international/local hybrids in Bosnia, Serbia, and Senegal).
51. See U.N. General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002,2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
52. WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ix
(2003).
53. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute, 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012).
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A. What Function Does, or Should, ICL Serve?
The IMT at Nuremberg heralded a resurgence in natural (non-positive) law
54
as a means to ensure against the totalitarian excesses that led to the war. 5 This
emerged from a two-tiered challenge faced by the Allied powers seeking to use
law at the close of war to define the coming peace. First, as discussed, the crimes
articulated by the IMT were largely novel, and thus faced a deep intellectual
challenge in the opprobrium nullem crimen sine lege.5 6  Second, the crimes
committed by Nazi actors which the Allies sought to prosecute emerged not from
brute lawlessness but rather from a strict and terrible lawfulness: the positive law,
i.e. written, textual law of the Nazi regime had made many of the atrocities
perpetrated before and during the war "legal" in Germany.
57
To circumvent these challenges, the IMT drew on natural law arguments
regarding a universally recognizable "human good
58 to legitimize its practice.59
In its Judgment, the IMT argued that in "circumstances [where the defendant] must
know that he is doing wrong, [...] so far from it being unjust to punish him, it
would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished."6 In this way, the
IMT, facing a significant positive law challenge, positioned itself not only within
the law, but as the definer of what is and is not within the law.
With this law-defining function, the IMT at Nuremberg established the
principle that trials can perform a didactic function by modeling, and thereby
instilling, liberal values for a targeted audience. Ad hoc tribunals are neither able
nor interested in bringing the same kind of justice as a national court system, the
justice that comes from objectively applying the laws of a given province equally
across every situation. Ad hoc courts are rather 'message' courts, or 'teaching
courts', designed to show by example that (some) crimes will not be met with
impunity (statistically speaking, most crimes arising from a situation an ad hoc
court is addressing are in fact met by impunity.) Judith Shklar's Legalism (1964)
argued that regardless of the substantive and procedural challenges levied against
the IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo, these trials, as well as other "political trials,"
provide value by instilling the "right kind" of ideals and political goals for the
targeted nations.6' Others have similarly argued that the type of lesson being
taught (i.e. political liberalism) can justify the methods used to impart the lesson,
54. SHKLAR, supra note 27, at 67.
55. PRIMUS, supra note 27, at 430.
56. Lawrence Douglas, From IMT to NMT: The Emergence of a Jurisprudence of Atrocity, in
REASSESSING THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRIAL 277-92 (2012).
57. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to the Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 641 (1958).
58. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 2 (1980); RAYMOND WACKS,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1-3 (2006).
59. Rodger Citron, The Nuremberg Trials and American Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal
Realism and the Revival of Natural Law, in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
SINCE 1945 (Herbert Reginbogin & Christoph Safferling, eds., 2006).
60. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 43, at 219.
61. SHKLAR supra note 27, at 143-90.
2016
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
even if those methods do not meet the neutral or impartial standards typically
assigned to courts.
62
As western liberalism emerged triumphant from the Cold War, many
theorists, legal scholar-practitioners, and policy makers highlighted the central role
that courts and rule of law processes might play in imparting and strengthening
liberal values in emerging democracies.63  Transitional justice, a normative and
theoretical discourse rooted in law and political science64 emerged from
constructivist theories regarding state building, and the particularized experiments
in social and political rebuilding in South America following decades of repressive
65 1jsdictatorships. Transitional justice theorizes that failure to address past violence
threatens future peace.
66
Although transitional justice was operationalized through both judicial (ad
hoc tribunals) and administrative (truth commissions, political lustration)
mechanisms, judicial mechanisms came to be preferred for their simultaneous
capacity to produce truth and impart justice.67 Antonio Cassese, a central figure in
the development of international criminal law, represents the arguments in favor of
trials (over truth commissions) as transitional justice mechanisms thus:
[T]rials establish individual responsibility over collective assignation of
guilt, i.e., they establish that not all Germans were responsible for the
Holocaust, nor all Turks for the Armenian genocide, nor all Serbs,
Muslims, Croats or Hutus, but individual perpetrators - although, of
course, there may be a great number of perpetrators; justice dissipates
the call for revenge, because when the Court metes out to the perpetrator
his just desserts, then the victims' calls for retribution are met; by dint of
dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled with their
erstwhile tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid
for their crimes; a fully reliable record is established of atrocities so that
future generations can remember and be made fully cognizant of what
happened.68
62. MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); see BASS,
supra note 31.
63. NEIL KRITZ ED., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (1995); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 12
(2000).
64. Liora Israel and Guillaume Mouralis, General Introduction, in DEALING WITH WARS AND
DICTATORSHIPS 1-20 (Liora Israel & Guillaume Mouralis, eds., 2014).
65. Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case
of Argentina, 100 YALE L. J. 2619 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in
International Law, 78 CAL. L. R. 449 (1990); Ruti G. Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Jose
Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies
Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1425 (1991)
66. See generally, BRONWYN LEEBAW, JUDGING STATE-SPONSORED VIOLENCE (2011).
67. Id. at 178.
68. ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE
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Cassese argued that a truth commission would be a less ideal mechanism for
transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia because: "(a) they have been the scene
of appalling atrocities which are beyond amnesty, (b) they are still riven by the
violent nationalisms or ethnic hatred over which the wars were fought, and (c) they
are not yet willing to be reconciled.,69  International criminal tribunals are
designed to make the "clean break" necessary in a post conflict situation.70
Following the transitional justice rationale, prosecuting crimes "clearly separates a
newly democratic government from the abuses of its predecessor". 71
Finally, ICL seeks to "criminalize" violations of international human rights
law. Lacking its own penology, ICL builds instead on the rationales used for
applying criminal sanctions at the domestic level.72 ICL thus borrows the
retribution, deterrence, and to some degree rehabilitation rubrics which underwrite
criminal law in domestic jurisdictions.
73
The ICTY draws on all these ideas as legitimizing mandates. Constructed in
1993 under the U.N.'s "peace and security" mandate, the ICTY is charged with
promoting peace in the Balkans and thereby further security.74 These ideas borrow
from the IMT at Nuremberg's received role as a didactic actor for post-war
Germany, where the ICTY "sends a message that the cost of ethnic hatred and
violence as an instrument of power [increasingly] outweighs its benefits."" In its
judgments, ICTY judges have opined that the purpose of the Tribunal is to "make
plain.., that the international community [is] not ready to tolerate serious
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, 76 or to express the
outrage by the international community.77 In this regard, the ICTY articulates its
mandate and contribution thus:
11(2005).
69. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MODERN L. REV. 1, 5
(1998).
70. Teitel, supra note 63, at 56.
71. Carla Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS:
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 15 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post, eds., 1999).
72. M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 588 (2003);
Cassese, supra note 69; Mark Drumbl, A Hard Look at the Soft Theory of International Criminal Law,
in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M CHERIF
BASSOUNI (Leila Nadya Sadat and Michael P. Scharf eds. 2008).
73. Rock, supra note 29, at 28.
74. S.C. Res. 808, 1 9 (Feb. 22, 1993).
75. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (2001).
76. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 185 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asjOO0324e.pdf.
77. Prosecutor v. Simi6, Tadid and Zarii6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 1059
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/simic/tjug/en/sim-tj031017e.pdf.
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The Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm
for conflict resolution and post-conflict development across the globe,
specifically that leaders suspected of mass crimes will face justice. The
Tribunal has proved that efficient and transparent international justice is
possible. The Tribunal has contributed to an indisputable historical
record, combating denial and helping communities come to terms with
their recent history. Crimes across the region can no longer be denied.
For example, it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the mass
murder at Srebrenica was genocide.78
This description aptly comports with the value that Shklar finds for political
trials.
79
At the same time, ICTY judgments have uniformly invoked deterrence and
retribution rationales borrowed from domestic criminal law.80  Deterrence is
usually characterized as general, not specific, since the Tribunal has recognized
"the likelihood of persons convicted here ever again being faced with an
opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or grave
breaches is so remote as to render its consideration in this way unreasonable and
unfair."
8 1
78. ABOUT THE ICTY, http://www.icty.org/en/about ( last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
79. SHKLAR, supra note 27, at 145-46.
80. See, e.g., ICTY Prosecutorial statements:
The publication of the evidence before the Tribunal and the issue of the international warrant
of arrest have important deterrent effects. I dare say that no sane or rational person would
wish to render himself or herself subject to such proceedings. In the future, would-be
violators of international humanitarian law will know that such a fate may be in store for him
or her and that knowledge may well stop or at least curb [such criminal] conduct.
Prosecutor v. Nikoli6, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Trial Transcript 58 II. 21-25, 59 II. 1-4 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 9, 1995) (Goldstone Opening Statement). See also ICTY judgments:
"The jurisprudence of the Tribunal emphasises deterrence and retribution as the main general
sentencing factors." Simi6, supra note 77, 1059. "It is universally accepted and reflected in
judgments of [ICTY & ICTR] ... that deterrence and retribution are general factors to be taken into
account when imposing sentence." Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber, 900
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 31, 2003). See also Prosecutor v. Nikoli6, Case No.
IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 1 59, 85, 93 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18,
2003) [hereafter "Nikoli Sentencing Judgment"] (identifying retribution as a "primary objective," with
deterrence a "further hope," and stating rehabilitation as a guiding principle, particularly as regards
plea bargains); Prosecutor v. Simic, supra note 77, 1059 ("The jurisprudence of the Tribunal
emphasizes deterrence and retribution as the main general sentencing factors."); Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Kova6, and Vukovi, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 385 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (rejecting alleged trend away from retribution in
international law); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 508 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002); Prosecutor v. Todorovik, Case No. IT-95-9/1-S,
Sentencing Judgment, 28-29 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2001); Prosecutor
v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 288 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Delali, Mucic, Deli6, Zdravko Muci6, and Land~o, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 11 1234 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
1998) ("deterrence is probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences.").
81. Kunarac, supra note 80, 840. But see, Babi Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 45
(pointing out specific deterrence is the main aim/effect of punishment, and there is also a general
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The ICTY has freely invoked a transitional justice rubric regarding its
messaging capacity, as well as relying on standard criminal justice rationales
regarding the value and purpose of punishment. These legitimizing discourses do
not co-exist flawlessly, however. As Shklar notes in her assessment of the IMT at
Nuremberg, "all analogies drawn from municipal law, for all their tempting
familiarity, are unconvincing" because "the acts themselves were .. . novel in the
extreme.,82 More fundamentally, the didactic, modeling, regime re-defining role
imposed by ICL as a political trial or transitional justice mechanism is distinct
from the criminal justice model of international criminal tribunals ("ICTs") as
deterrent, retributive institutions. This i  not necessarily so domestically: domestic
judicial institutions enjoy a socially constitutive role as administrative
representations of governing rules applicable to, and generated by, a particular
society.83  However, ICTs are importantly quite distinct from domestic courts.
First, they do not prosecute all crimes of a particular sort but rather select crimes
(this is the nature of ad hoc courts, discussed above).84 Second, they draw their
legitimacy from natural law.85  In practice, this generates operationalization
problems at the intersection of law and politics. Domestic criminal law is
necessarily a political agent, responding to political calculi and politically defined
priorities (and changing in form and substance to reflect political changes).
86
Because ICL, on the other hand, draws its legitimacy from natural law (which is
universal and eternal), it must exist above politics. Natural law supplies a non-
derogable standard, which explicitly rejects political categories or categorization.
87
Yet when operationalized, ICL encounters what Jan Klabbers identifies as the
standard problems of accountability faced by all international organizations,
wherein the founders' interest will not always align with the organization's
mandate.88 This disconnect is magnified in the case of international organizations
with a judicial function, as objectivity is necessarily a central element both of
function and legitimacy of such institutions.
89
deterrence effect); Prosecutor v. Mrda, , Case No. IT- 02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, 16 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004) (noting that the main deterrent effect is to tum
perpetrator away from future wrongdoing).
82. SHKLAR, supra note 27, at 162, 167.
83. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (TRANS. ALAN SHERIDAN, 1977); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974);
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS (1981); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990).
84. See supra text accompanying note 80.
85. See FOUCAULT, supra note 83.
86. See Anne Sa'adah, Regime Change: Lessons from Germany on Justice, Institution Building,
and Democracy, 50 J. CONFLICT RES. 303 (2006) (discussing how "justice" is defined by governing
regimes, and thus constitutes a political category).
87. FINNIS, supra note 58, at 18.
88. JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 201 (3rd ed.
2015) (defining this conflict of interest as a problem of accountability).
89. See Kerstin Carlson, International Criminal Law and Its Paradoxes: Structural Failures in
the Use of International Criminal Law as a Transitional Justice Mechanism (forthcoming Journal of
Law and Courts 2016) (arguing that ICTs are structurally unable to perform their socially constitutive
mandates because of their construction as international organizations).
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In the following sections, this article demonstrates how the Plavi6 and Babi6
Judgments represent conflicting, and unresolved, sources of legitimation for ICL.
In Plavgi6, an international community eager to assert its own singular rule-making
capacity used the willingness of one (albeit non-ideal) defendant to shore up the
entire ICL process as a means of communicating "liberal" values. Thus the
Plavgik case follows Shklar's calculus regarding the value of political trials as
didactic actors. This didactic capacity is evidenced in the transitional justice-based
insistence on the value of Plav§iW's plea "for reconciliation" in the former
Yugoslavia. Although Plavgi6 never abandons her nationalist beliefs, she does
abandon nationalist politics in favor of solutions championed by western powers;
this "path," which is synonymous with moral rectitude and reminiscent of the self-
congratulatory rhetoric associated with the foundation of the IMT discussed above,
is thus presented as the reconciliatory path she must model for her countrymen.
In contrast, while Milan Babi actually makes a personal journey from
nationalist to liberal beliefs, this journey is undertaken outside the confines of
western institutions or policy makers and therefore is without the capacity to
demonstrate the morality of western paradigms and practices. Thus it is not
received or recognized by the Tribunal, which instead assesses Babit's criminal
liability through a criminal justice calculus. Under a criminal justice rubric,
neither the content of the crimes before the Tribunal nor the legitimacy of the
Tribunal itself is in question or at stake.90 Discounted as a didactic example, the
only service Babi can render the Tribunal is as an object of punishment.9' Taken
together, this incongruent jurisprudence reveals the unresolved legitimation crisis
at the heart of ICL.
III. PLEADING GUILTY TO ATROCITY: CONTRASTING THE PLA VSI AND
BABI1 PROCESSES
When the Rules of Procedure of the ICTY 92 were drafted in 1994 by the first
ICTY judges, the particular make-up of the court staff, as well as the influence
over the Tribunal exerted behind the scenes by the United States, dictated that the
'hybrid' procedure of the Tribunal, which had been intended to represent a mixture
of the dominant global legal systems of common and civil law,93 leaned decidedly
90. U.S. Dep't of State, Int'l Crim. Justice, Remarks of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor,
Dep't of State 2 (2012), http://www.state.gov/s/I/releases/remarks/200957.htm.
91. Punishment under a criminal justice rubric can be said to serve a "didactic" purpose only to
the extent it teaches its objects to recognize the power of the state over their bodies and minds.
FOUCAULT, supra note 83, at 303; GARLAND supra note 83. This is distinct from the didacticism
imagined by advocates of transitional justice, who imagine that institutions can model behavior. This is
a dichotomy between preach (convince) versus punish (subjugate).
92. The rules have now been revised fifty times; the latest revision dates from July 2015. See
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, Int'l Criminal Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 48 [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence],
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rulesprocedure-evidence/IT032_Rev43_en.pdf.
93. There is an extensive comparative law consideration of whether, and how, world legal
systems should be classified, some of which would contest the common law/civil law divide. See, e.g.,
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2006);
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toward an adversarial (common law) procedure.94 The adversarial legal tradition
practiced in the United States imagines that court judgments are spaces of debate.
95
This marketplace of ideas model explains not only the use of adversarial processes
to advance legal argumentation, but also the form that judgments take, where
decisions include both the reasoned opinion in favor of the judicial determination
as well as relevant dissenting opinions.96
Regardless of the strong U.S. influence, plea bargaining, a central element of
U.S. criminal law practice,97 was not initially permitted by the ICTY rules.98 The
self-interested barter at the center of plea bargaining is in many ways an affront to
jurists trained in a civil law tradition, and was further considered possibly
inappropriate given the gravity of crimes the ICTY was construed to try. 99 It was
only after Dra~en Erdemovi' °° came forward to admit responsibility for dozens of
murders in conjunction with the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995 that the ICTY
initiated plea bargains.
A. Introducing Plea Bargaining to International Criminal Law
As practiced in U.S. law, plea bargaining can consist of 'charge bargaining'
and/or 'sentence bargaining' wherein a mitigation of charges and/or sentence
length is traded with the defendant in exchange for her admission of guilt.
1 1
Following the Erdemovi6 case, the ICTY has engaged in variations of both forms.
Under a charge bargaining rubric, the OTP revises the indictment against the
accused, dropping certain charges in exchange for the accused's plea of guilt.
10 2
Sentence bargaining, on the other hand, is more complex and much less assured.
Mariana Pargendler, The Rise and Decline of Legal Families, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043 (2012).
94. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995); see also, Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of
Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
243 (2004); BASS, supra note 31; JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES
IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003).
95. See ROBERTA. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).
96. In the U.S. tradition, there are many famous dissents that have gone on to become the law of
the land. Contrast this with the civil law tradition, where dissents are typically swallowed. See MIRiAN
R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
97. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L. J. 857, 1012-13 (2000) (90-95% of
criminal cases resolved through guilty pleas in the U.S.).
98. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92.
99. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA (1997); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2013).
100. Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Erdemovi6 Sentencing Judgment]; Prosecutor v.
Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997) [hereafter Erdemovid Appeals Judgment].
101. Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS.
J. 338, 346-47 (1982).
102. Amended indictments must be submitted to the Trial Chamber for approval, but thus far, no
indictment has been refused amendment for the purpose of securing a guilty plea. ICTY Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, at Rule 50.
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In exchange for a plea of guilty, the OTP will recommend a shortened sentence for
the accused, sometimes joining with defendant's counsel to agree on a proposed
sentence length.103 ICTY Chambers are not bound by this suggestion.1°4 ICTY
case law has found the defendant's guilty plea and/or statement of remorse as a
mitigating factor to be considered in sentencing, ostensibly resulting in shortened
sentences.10 5  The bottom line, however, is that after confirming the OTPs
charges,106 the Trial Chamber is free to pronounce the sentence it deems fit
regardless of what the OTP, defense, or previously decided cases might suggest.
The Erdemovi6 case coincided with pressure from the U.N. to increase ICTY
efficiency107 as well as the concern that the ICTY violated defendants' rights
through the length of its proceedings,10 8 and instituting a practice of plea
bargaining carried the promise of addressing both institutional challenges.
Hybridizing plea bargains by maintaining the complete judicial independence of
the Trial Chamber regarding sentence length assuaged concerns, most often
iterated by civil law jurists, related to justice. And insistence that plea bargains
and statements of remorse increased Tribunal legitimacy and social reconstruction
(borrowing heavily from the Erdemovi6 experience) seemed to address concerns
that plea bargains might threaten ICTY legitimacy, not bolster it.
Following Erdemovi6 there have been twenty guilty pleas before the ICTY.'09
These pleas comprise one-third of all convictions before the Tribunal, 10 have been
cited repeatedly as important reconciliatory mechanisms by expert witnesses
appearing before the Tribunal, and in Tribunal judgments themselves."' Guilty
103. View From the Hague, Debates on Guilty Pleas,
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view fromhague/balkan 031203 en.pdf.
104. But see, NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 57-114 (2007) (arguing that because Chambers
nearly always take the OTP's recommendation into account, with Babi6 the one exception, it should be
represented that sentence bargaining is possible before the Tribunal).
105. Dixon & Demirdjian, Advising Defendants about Guilty Pleas before International Courts, 3
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 680, 681 (2005) (arguing guilty pleas reduce sentences by 1/3). Due to the
discretionary and highly non-uniform nature of ICTY sentences, however, estimating the impact of plea
bargaining on sentence length can only ever be speculative.
106. The Trial Chamber is permitted to enquire into the terms of the plea agreement, and has
discretion regarding acceptance of a guilty plea. See Nikoli6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 80, 154.
107. "Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda" A/54/634, Nov. 22, 1999.
108. Patricia Wald, ICTY Judicial Proceedings: An Appraisal From Within, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
ICJ 466, 468 (2004).
109. U.N. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Guilty Pleas,
http://www.icty.org/en/cases/guilty-pleas (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
110. Ralph Henham & Mark Drumbl, Plea Bargaining at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 16 CRIM. L. FORUM 49, 53 (2005).
111. Although "reconciliation" is not formally part of the ICTY's mandate, reconciliation among
the former warring peoples in the Balkans is an oft-cited goal of the ICTY. See, e.g., President of the
Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 16, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (Aug. 17, 1994),
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pleas are argued to advance the cause of reconciliation in a variety of ways, among
them access to information in the possession of the accused,1 2 bringing relief to
victims,1 3 as well as increasing Tribunal legitimacy through the specter of
defendant cooperation' 4 Centrally, nearly all guilty pleas are accompanied by a
statement of remorse from the defendant at the sentencing hearing. Such tidy
soundbites, articulated in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, are highlighted by the ICTY
as important reconciliatory mechanisms for the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.
The two plea bargains considered herein were the 8th and 17
t
h, respectively, to
be entered before the ICTY. Coming only one year apart, they both occurred as
the ICTY was experiencing its political ascent. The challenges of the Tribunal's
early years, with a tiny budget and no international cooperation on the ground to
make arrests, had been triumphantly overcome: on the eve of Plavgit's trial, when
she changed her plea to guilty, the ICTY had Slobodan Milogevid in custody, the
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports /20and%/ 2OPublications/Annua[Reports/annualreport_1994
en.pdf
(Chief Judge Antonio Cassese named reconciliation as central to the Tribunal's work in his 1994 report
to the U.N.); Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4, 1 80 ('The Trial Chamber accepts that acknowledgement
and full disclosure of serious crimes are very important when establishing the truth in relation to such
crimes. This, together with acceptance of responsibility for the committed wrongs, will promote
reconciliation."); "Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, not
people, as perpetrators of war crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and religious
hatreds and begin the healing process." Nikoli6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 80, 1 60 (citing a
statement by the Representative of the United States at the 3217th Security Council Meeting). See also
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Dosen, and Kolundzija, Case No. IT-95-8-S, Trial Chamber Sentencing
Judgment, 11 149 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Sikirica
Sentencing Judgment]; Janine Natalya Clark, Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and
Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 415 (2009). Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the
Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 737
(1998) (arguing that the truth of the Balkan wars is principally a truth of elite politicians fomenting
nationalism to serve their own power interests and that by prosecuting those most responsible for the
wars of the Former Yugoslavia and individualizing their guilt, the ICTY could free citizens of the
Former Yugoslavia from the weight of collective responsibility and recast nationalist arguments in the
light of political realism). See, e.g., Nikolid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 80, 145 (identifying the
Tribunal's mandate as restoring peace and promoting reconciliation). On the other hand, reconciliation
is absent from the ICTY founding documents, in contrast to its sister court, the ICTR. Moreover,
proponents of the Tribunal's work often bristle at the suggestion that the ICTY should be judged against
a standard as wide and undefined as 'reconciliation.' One senior ICTY employee exploded when I
asked a question about reconciliation in a semi-structured interview in 2005: "Where do you get this
idea about reconciliation! There is no mandate for reconciliation! Look in the Security Council
documents, the court documents, it's not there. This idea of reconciliation has been projected onto the
ICTY by diplomats. But it's ridiculous to charge the court with reconciliation!" Interview, The Hague,
(May 2005) (notes on file with author.)
112. "[A] guilty plea contributes directly to one of the fundamental objectives of the international
tribunal: namely, its truth-finding function." See, Sikirica Sentencing Judgment, supra note 111, 149
"[A] guilty plea is always important for the purpose of establishing the truth in relation to a crime."
Todorovid, supra note 80, 81. "Discovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a
fundamental step on the way to reconciliation." See Erdemovi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 100,
21.
113. See Nikolid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 80.
114. Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4, In 66-81.
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first sitting political leader to face indictment and trial before an international
court.15  This is not to say that the Tribunal did not still face significant
challenges, most notably the intransigence of nationalist politics in the Balkans
bent on defying the Tribunal, and the accompanying threat to peace and security
represented by such politics.'16 The Plavgi6 and Babi cases, concluded in 2003
and 2004,117 should therefore be read against these two backdrops: the institutional
ascent of the Tribunal, which had an annual budget of more than $200 million at
this time,1/8 as well as the ongoing success of hardline nationalist politicians in
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia./1 9
Map of Yugoslavia from National Geographic, August 1990.12°
115. ICTY PUBLICATIONS, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163-general/28696-the-trial-of-slobodan-
milosevic.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
116. For example, the Serbian pro-democracy president Zoran Dindid was assassinated in March
2003.
117. See Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13; Plavgi6 Judgment, supra note 4.
118. Geoffrey R. Watson, The Changing Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 871, 871 (2003).
119. LARA J. NETTELFIELD & SARAH E. WAGNER, SREBRENICA IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE GENOCIDE 128 (2014).
120. Photo: National Geographic Society Cartopraphic Division, Yugoslavia, A House Much
Divided, 178 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, no. 2 (Aug. 1990), at 105, http://www.srpska-
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B. Plavi6 and Babi Before the ICTY
Biljana Plavgi6 was a biologist on the faculty of the University of Sarajevo
before entering politics and rising to a leadership position in the Bosnian Serb
nationalist party... As Bosnia descended into war, and throughout the war's most
brutal episodes, she served as one member of the tri-partite Bosnian-Serb
presidency. 122 In the push to "cleanse" territory to create a Greater Serbia, the war
in Bosnia claimed 100,000 lives123 and created an estimated 2.7 million
refugees.124 Plavgi6 became infamous for her inflammatory, nationalist rhetoric.1
25
In 1992, following a massacre by Serb paramilitaries in Bijelina, a photograph
circulated showing her stepping over the body of a dead civilian to kiss the
notorious paramilitary leader 'Arkan', whom she called "a real Serb hero."126 She
is reported to have claimed, "There are 12 million Serbs and even if six million
perish on the field of battle, there will still be six million to reap the fruits of the
struggle."'127 Touring scenes of destruction in eastern Bosnia in 1992 she remarked
"I'd like to see Eastern Bosnia completely cleansed of Muslims,"'128 whom she
referred to as "genetically deformed material."'129  In her 2005 memoirs, she
continued to advocate the benefits of an ethnically-cleansed Bosnia, "[O]ne next to
another, but not together, so that we can save our lives and they can save their
souls.' 130  Serbian Radical Party President Vojislav Segelj, himself "a declared
Serb nationalist"'31 categorized her as "insufferably extremist."'
132
mreza.com/library/facts/map-NatGeogr-1990.html (Colors represent areas where an ethnic nationality
constitutes 50% or more of the population.").
121. See Plav~i6 Judgment supra note 4, 1110.
122. Id.
123. Research and Documentation Center, BOSNIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD (2013). The ICTY puts
the figure higher, at 140,000. Joe Sterling, Karadzic calls himself 'tolerant,' says foes plotted
massacre, CNN (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/16/world/europe/netherlands-karadzic-
trial/.
124. See U.N. Refugee Agency, Looking back at the siege of Sarajevo-20 years after (Apr. 3,
2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4f7acfb5c7.html.
125. SLAVENKA DRAKULIC, THEY WOULD NEVER HURT A FLY: WAR CRIMINALS ON TRIAL IN THE
HAGUE (2004).
126. See, e.g., Slavenka Drakulic, The False Repentance of Biliana Plavgi6, EUROZINE, Oct. 23,
2009.
127. BBC NEWS, Biliana PlavVi: Serbian Iron Lady (Feb. 27, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/I 108604.stm.
128. JANINE DI GIOVANNI, MADNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF WAR (2003).
129. Id.
130. Jelena Suboti6, The Cruelty of False Remorse: Biliana Plavgi6 at The Hague, 36
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 39, 57 (2012),
https://www.academia.edu/2578509iTheCrueltyof False RemorseBiljana Plavsic at The Hague
(quoting Plavgid).
131. Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-98-29, Hearing, 43373, 11.1-2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2005).
132. Id. at 43371,1. 25, 43373, 1. 1.
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In 1995 the Dayton Accords ended the war and split Bosnia into two entities:
the Federation (51% of the territory, comprised of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats) and Republika Srpska ("RS") (49% of the territory, and nearly entirely
ethnically cleansed of non-ethnic Serbs).133  Plav§i's war time co-president
Radovan Karad~i6, the most powerful member of the RS tri-partite presidency and
a central architect of the murder and terror that characterized the war in Bosnia,
was banned from public office. 134 Karadi6 nominated Plavgid to run for president
of RS and she won the 1996 election.1 35 Plavgi6 eventually broke with Karadi6
and the other hardline nationalists over implementation of the unpopular Dayton
Accords. 3 6  With the international community's assistance and even, on one
occasion, military intervention, 137 Plav~i6 remained in power to serve her two-year
mandate. In exchange, she oversaw a program more moderate than that advocated
by her former colleagues. By the end of 1997 Plavgi6 had begun to cooperate with
international actors, removing Ratko Mladi6 as Commander of Bosnian Serb
forces, for example.138  In 1998, she lost her bid for re-election and quit the
political scene. 139
After leaving power, Plavgi6 was indicted by the ICTY on charges which
included genocide. 140 She did not defy the Tribunal as other of her countrymen
had done, and was thus able to negotiate significant concessions regarding her
physical presence in The Hague. 141 Still, she rejected the charges against her until
the last minute, when on the eve of her trial and facing a possible life sentence,
Plavgi6 pled guilty to "persecutions."142 In exchange the OTP dropped all other
charges against her and recommended a fifteen to twenty-five year sentence;1
43
Plavgi6 eventually received eleven years.
133. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-
Serb., Dec. 14, 1995, http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-frm.htm [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords].
134. Jane Perlez, U.S. Presses Effort to Remove Indicted Bosnian Serb Leader, N.Y. TIMES (July
19, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/19/world/us-presses-effort-to-remove-indicted-bosnian-
serb-leader.html.
135. Karadzic Won't Run in Nationwide Elections, CNN (July 3, 1996),
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9607/03/karadzic.wont.run/.
136. Plavgi6 Judgment, supra note 4, 11 91-92.
137. Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1, at 538, 584.
138. Id. at 559. After more than a decade on the run, Mladi6 was apprehended by the ICTY. Anna
Holligan, Ratko Mladic War Crime Defence Begins, BBC NEWS (May, 19, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27464998. He is now standing trial for charges which include
genocide in relation to the massacre of more than 7000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica. Id.
139. Plavti6 Judgment, supra note 4, 86.
140. Id. 17.
141. Plavti6 received very special handling by the OTP from the beginning of her case: she
negotiated her arrival in The Hague to follow Orthodox Christmas, and was released provisionally
before her trial date. id. 83. Provisional release is almost never awarded by the Tribunal. See
Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair
Trial Rights, 8 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1, 22-23, 25 (2009).
142. Prosecutor v. Krajinik, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Plea Agreement, 1 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Plavgi6 Plea Agreement].
143. Plavgi6 Judgment, supra note 4, 128; see id. at Schedules A-D; see also id 141-43
(describing criminal acts that happened during and after expulsion).
VOL. 44:2
RECONCILIATION THROUGH A JUDICIAL LENS
It was while serving her sentence in a comfortable Swedish prison'44 that
Plavgi6 first recanted her statement of remorse;145 she affirmed this position in
other interviews and in her memoirs.146 Although the OTP had entered the plea
agreement "without prejudice,"'147 which would allow the revisitation of the
dropped charges in the event of changed events, the ICTY Trial Chamber did not
permit this.148  Plav~i6 came up for parole six years into her eleven year
sentence, 149 and she was released in 2009, without mention that she had retracted
the admissions underlying her sentence.'50 At the time of this writing she lives
comfortably in Belgrade.' 51
Like Biljana Plav~i6, Milan Babi6 was a part-time politician rocketed to power
during, and by, events connected with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. A
dentist by training, Babid became a central figure in the Serbian nationalist party in
Croatia in February 1990.152 Following Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in
February 1991, Babid's party advocated the creation of an independent Serb state
in the territory known as Krajina, ' 53 and realized this through the so-called "log
revolution" where Croatian Serbs barred access to the Krajina territory by
blockading all major thoroughfares with logs. 114  In April 1991, Babi6 became
President of this territory.'55 In the following months, Croatian Serbs ethnically
cleansed Krajina of non-Serbs through force and violence: 230 people were killed
144. Plavgid Early Release Decision, supra note 25, 1. European countries cooperate with the
ICTY by jailing convicted defendants. Not all European jails are created equal, however, and
Scandinavian prisons are generally the most comfortable. Plavgid's stationment in a Swedish prison
likely reflects another aspect of her negotiation with the Tribunal. Id. 2. Plav§iW's Swedish prison
offered horseback riding as a prisoner activity. Luxury prison for Bosnia "s Iron Lady, THE TELEGRAPH
(June 07, 2003), http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030607/asp/foreign/story.2044806.asp. Because
Plavgid was of retirement age, she was not required to work in prison, and the prison report stated that
she passed her time "cooking and baking." Plavi Early Release Decision, supra note 25 9.
145. Nordegren, supra note 20.
146. Plavi Early Release Decision, supra note 25, 8; Plav§iW's Memoirs, supra note 20.
147. Plavgi6 Plea Agreement, supra note 141, 3, 9(a).
148. Plav~i6 Early Release Decision, supra note 25, 5.
149. Id I 2, 6. Parole guidelines are determined by the states housing ICTY convicts; serving in
Sweden, Plavgid was subject to Swedish regulations about the timing and criteria for parole, which she
met. Id 1.
150. Id. 14. The Tribunal stopped at the phrase "sufficient reconciliation," and did not explicate
further. Id. 11 13-14.
151. Plavsic 's Triumphant Return to Belgrade, EURONEWS (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://www.euronews.com/2009/1 0/27/plavsic-s-triumphant-return-to-belgrade/.
152. Babi Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 18.
153. Id. 20. Krajina, which means "the end" is a territory settled by Serbs in the 170, and 18 h
centuries, and designed as a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. LAURA
SILBER & ALLEN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION 102 (TV Books, Inc. ed., Penguin Books
1996). The territory is located in the "elbow" of Croatia, on the Bosnian border. See Figure 1,
Yugoslavia, A House Much Divided, SRPSKA MREZA (May 3, 1998), http://www.srpska-
mreza.com/library/facts/map-NatGeogr-1990.html (citing to Yugoslavia, A House Much Divided,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Vol. 178, No. 2, at 105 (1990)) (showing ethnicity of populations in
Yugoslavia in 1991).
154. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 153, at 102.
155. Babi Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 21.
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in this campaign and tens of thousands fled the violence.' 56 Although Milan Babi6
was the dejure leader of this entity, Milan Marti6, operating a shadow government
taking its instructions from Belgrade, organized and enacted the violence.,57  In
early 1992, Babi6 broke with Milogevi6 over the question of targeting civilians. 1
58
Babi6 spent the remainder of the war politically sidelined, although still officially
occupying minor political positions, and fled Krajina in the path of Operation
Storm159 in 1995 along with 200,000 ethnic Serbs in one of the war's most massive
ethnic cleansing incidents.' 
60
BabiC's story intersected with that of the ICTY in October 2001, after Babi6
learned that he had been named as member of a joint criminal enterprise in the
Milogevi6 indictment.161  From his home in Belgrade, Babi6 reported to
representatives of the ICTY and made himself available for questioning.'62 By the
Prosecutor's own admission, BabiCs availability was "extensive[]' 163 and he
cooperated with the OTP over a period of several months. In interviews with
Babit the OTP amassed a documentary trove of more than 1,200 interview
156. SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 153, at 358.
157. See Martid Judgment, supra note 19, 41 140, 343.
158. Id. 1467. In the relevant literature there is a mixed assessment of Babid's role in the war, his
relationship with Milo~evi6, and his character. The so-called "log revolution" in Knin represents the
commencement of violence in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and Babi6 played a central role in this
event. MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 17 (Penguin Books
1994). Journalist Misha Glenny thus puts Babil's "badness" on par with Milogevi6's. Id. Journalists
Laura Silber and Allen Little are more agnostic on the subject of Babi6's character and motivation, and
present him as manipulated, bullied, and finally discarded, by his patron Milogevi. See generally
SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 153 (discussing BabiC's character and motivation). The ICTY's
sentencing judgment of Babi6 does not shed light on how to interpret BabiC's actions, although non-
contested evidence was offered demonstrating that Babi6 worked towards a political solution in Krajina
because he was opposed to violence and its cost for civilians. See Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra
note 13,11 23, 28.
159. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-1, Factual Statement, 5 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom4/en/plea-fact.pdf
[hereinafter Babi6 Factual Statement]; Gabriel Partos, Milan Babic: Croatian Serb leader, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 6, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4779362.stm [hereinafter Partros]. The Krajina
question was eventually resolved militarily. "Operation Storm" which retook Krajina has itself become
the subject of ICTY prosecution. Prosecutor v.Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Judgment, 1111, 3, 13
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Gotovina Judgment].
160. The numbers are disputed. The BBC reports that 200,000 fled. Id. Croatia has put the
number at 90,000, the United Nations at between 150-200,000, and Serbian sources at 250,000. Carl
Bildt, the European Union Special Envoy to the Former Yugoslavia, called it "the most efficient ethnic
cleansing we've seen in the Balkans." Daniel Pearl, Few Serbs Chased from Croatia in 1995 Have
Made it Back Home, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 1999),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/pear1042299.htm (quoting Carl Bildt's statement);
Marko Hoare notes that the Serbs organized the flight themselves, thus differentiating this incident from
other instances of ethnic cleansing during the war. Hoare, supra note 19. See also Partos, supra note
159; Matt Prodger, Evicted Serbs Remember Storm, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4747379.stm [hereinafter Prodger].
161. Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 2.
162. Id.
163. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72, Sentencing Hearing, 78 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Apr. 1 Babi6 Sentencing Hearing].
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transcript pages containing descriptions of the events, players, and actions
surrounding the Croatian Serb take-over of the Krajina territory in Croatia, as well
as specific information as to the ways in which such a take-over was effectuated,
included details about the support of both Milogevi6 and the Yugoslav army.'64
Babi6 made such statements while fully admitting his own role and his own guilt,
and without bartering for any form of immunity. In 2003, Babi6 was indicted
based on information he provided.65 Although the OTP called for a sentence of
less than eleven years, Babi6 received thirteen. He committed suicide in The
Hague in 2005, while testifying for the OTP in the Martie case.166 At the time of
his death, Babi6 had testified against Milogevi6, 167 Krajignik, 168 and Marti6,169 and
was due to testify against Simatovi6,17 ° Stanisi6,171 and Segelj.172 Marti's defense
counsel described Babi6 as the trial's "most important prosecution witness."'
' 73
IV. CONSTRUCTING GUILT, CRIMINALITY AND PUNISHMENT IN PLA VSIC
AND BABI
When a defendant pleads guilty before the ICTY, the Trial Chamber must
determine that the plea was "voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that there
was a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused's participation in it"
before finding guilt .174 Sentencing is a separate phase, wherein evidence (largely
testimony) is produced to support the parties' arguments regarding sentence length.
Both Plav~i6 and Babi6 negotiated pleas of guilt with the OTP, which in both cases
produced an amended indictment as well as a "factual statement" signed by each
164. Id. at 78-80. Babi's testimony implicated Serbs from Serbia in the highest echelons of
power for responsibility for the violence in Croatia. The ICTY has found it difficult to judicially
establish the link between Serbian power brokers (in the government and the military) with war in the
former Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Perisi6, Case No. IT-04-8 1-A, Judgment, In 119-20, 122 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (for an example of an acquittal of a Serbian
general by the ICTY, although this link is widely recognized). Thus, Babi6's testimony was singular
and critical for the prosecution.
165. Prosecutor v. Babid, Case No. IT-03-72, Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Babi6 Indictment].
166. Marti6 Judgment, supra note 19, 33; Ian Traynor, Serbian War Criminal Kills Himself in
Hague Prison, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2006),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/07/warcrimes.iantraynor.
167. Prosecutor v. Milo~evi6, Case No IT-02-54, Witness List for the Prosecution Case - Croatia
and Bosnia (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 26, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan -milosevic/pros/en/CroatiaBosniaphase2O926.htm.
168. Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No IT-00-39, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).
169. Martid Judgment, supra note 19, 1 33.
170. Prosecutor v. Staniti6, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 30, 2013); Janet Anderson, Babi,6 Suicide a Blow for Prosecutors, IWPR (Mar. 10,
2006), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/babic-suicide-blow-prosecutors.
171. Stanigid, supra note 169; Anderson, supra note 170.
172. Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No IT-03-67, Transcript of Status Conference 418 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 26, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/trans/en/050926SC.htm; Anderson, supra note 170.
173. Id.
174. Plavi6 Judgment, supra note 4, at 5.
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defendant accompanying the plea.175  Both then faced a public hearing to
determine sentencing, where witnesses for the OTP and the defense (and some
witnesses who were jointly submitted) testified regarding elements, which the
Tribunal should consider when awarding the sentence. 1
76
During Plav~ir's two-and-a-half-day hearing, witnesses spoke to two themes:
the brutal trauma of the war experience (three witnesses) and Plav~id's central
post-war role in implementing the Dayton Accords (five witnesses).77  The
reconciliatory potential of Plavi6's plea of guilt effectively took center stage, as
the prosecution and defense worked together to create a story of a leader on the
path to liberalism, and an institution (the ICTY) making such a path possible. In
this narrative, Plavgit's post war conduct emerged as more important, and more
noteworthy, than her wartime conduct. Babit's two-day hearing was a markedly
different affair. No international names or figures spoke on his behalf. Instead,
two witnesses presented information to the Tribunal; Mladen Lon~ar, a Croatian
psychiatrist speaking to the trauma of ethnic cleansing as lived by the Croatians
driven out of Krajina, and Drago Kova~evi6, a Croatian Serb working as a social
worker in Belgrade, but who had been a local politician in a multi-ethnic party in
Krajina and who had worked with Babi in that capacity.'78 The joint narrative of
the Prosecution and efense, while less seamlessly imagined than in the Plavi6
hearing, was the story of a man overcome by events, taken in by nationalism and
fear before recognizing, and then rejecting, these political outcomes.
The following discussion focuses on the three most divergent areas of the
Plavi and Babie judgments: 1) the Chambers' constructions of criminality (more
specifically, the role and construction of "intent" in each judgment); 2) the
Chambers' construction of factors to be considered for sentencing (mitigating and
aggravating elements of the cases); and 3) the narrative arcs of each case (which
players impacted them, and how). Finally, this section demonstrates how these
constructions support, and are supported by, two diverging rationales for ICL
175. Prosecutor v. Babi6, Case No. IT-03-72-1, Plea Agreement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom4/n/040122a.pdf [hereinafter
Babi Plea Agreement]; see Plavgid Plea Agreement, supra note 142; see Babi Factual Statement,
supra note 159; Prosecutor v. Babi, Case No. IT-03-72-1, Amendment to the Joint Motion for
Consideration of Plea Agreement Between Milan Babi and the Office of the Prosecutor Pursuant to
Rule 62 ter (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom4/en/plea annexA.pdf [hereinafter Babid Amendment to the
Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement]; Prosecutor v. Krajinik, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-
PT, Factual Basis for Plea of Guilt (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 30, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/custom4/en/plea.pdf [hereinafter Plav~i6 Factual Basis for Plea of
Guilt]; Plavi6 Indictment, supra note 4.
176. See Apr. 1 Babid Sentencing Hearing, supra note 163; Babi6 Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing
Transcript, supra note 3; Prosecutor v. Plavti6, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Sentencing Hearing (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 16, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/trans/en/0212161T.htm [hereinafter Plav~i6 Dec. 16 Sentencing
Hearing Transcript]; Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1; Plav§i6 Dec. 18 Sentencing
Hearing Transcript, supra note 23.
177. Dec. 16 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 176; Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing
Transcript, supra note 1; Dec. 18 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 23.
178. See Apr. 1 Babi Sentencing Hearing, supra note 163; see also Babi6 Apr. 2 Sentencing
Hearing Transcript, supra note 3.
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legitimacy, preaching (Shklar's didactic liberalism) verses punishment (the
criminal justice rubric of control).
A. Intent and Questions of Criminality in Plavi6 and Babi
Both Plavi and Babi were charged with "persecutions"'179 and convicted of
committing these acts under a theory of liability called "joint criminal enterprise"
("JCE"). Article 7.1 of the ICTY statute defines "commission" of crimes.'80 JCE,
constructed by ICTY judges as an interpretation of Article 7. 1, makes it possible to
attribute liability for violence to defendants who are physically separated from the
violence. It does this by making "intent" (motivation) synonymous with
"knowledge" (awareness).18 1  In its most exaggerated form (called JCE III), it
decreases the motivation of the perpetrator to "foreseeability" (at domestic law,
this is a negligence standard, which is not generally applicable to grave crimes). 1
8 2
Thus, in the Tadi6 case, Tadi6 was found liable for murders in a location the
Tribunal could not demonstrate he had been.'8 3 The Tadi6 Chamber reasoned that
because Tadi6 had been engaged in the types of crimes against humanity
(persecutions, ethnic cleansing) that canforeseeably lead to death, he was liable for
murders committed in conjunction with these types of activities in other
locations.184  Using this rationale, both Plavgi6 and Babi6 were found to have
"committed" crimes furthering "joint criminal enterprises" although neither of
them personally committed, nor arguably were even aware of specifics pertaining
to, the violations of international humanitarian law substantiating their
persecutions charges.
179. Babi Amendment to the Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement, supra note 175,
91] 1-2; Plavgid Indictment, supra note 4, 11 23. In Plavi6's Plea Agreement, "persecutions" are
articulated as follows:
a. the existence of an armed conflict; b. the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population; c. the accused's conduct was related to the widespread
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; d. the accused had knowledge of
the wider context in which her conduct occurred; e. the accused committed acts or omissions
against a victim or victim population violating a basic or fundamental human right; f. the
accused intended to commit the violation; g. the accused's conduct was committed on
political, racial or religious grounds; and h. the accused's conduct was committed with a
deliberate intent to discriminate.
Plavti6 Plea Agreement, supra note 142, 1 5. In signing the plea agreement, Plavgic acknowledged that
she understood that the prosecutor was required to show these elements in order to prove the charge
against her to which she was pleading guilty. Id. I1 5, 11.
180. S.C. Res. 827, art. 7 (1), Statute of the Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Sept.
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%2OLibrary/Statute/statute-sept09 en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]. "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime." Id.
181. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, IM 189-93 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf
[hereinafter Tadid Jugement].
182. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 91 (1968).
183. Tadi Judgment, supra note 181, 1 230-33, 237.
184. Id.
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The intent to commit a crime, "mens rea" or the guilty mind, is a global
standard.185  There are some crimes that bypass intent in favor of "strict
liability": 86 the crime of statutory rape is an oft-quoted example. Yet strict
liability in criminal law remains the exception, not the rule, and for most crimes,
questions of the intention of the perpetrator remain central to determining the
perpetrator's guilt. In principle, this is the same at international criminal law.'
87
The statute of the ICC, for example, specifically requires that the "mental element"
be present in order to commit a crime.188 While the ICTY statute does not address
the question of intent, prominent ICL scholar William Schabas argues that "the
judges of the ICTY have treated mens rea as an element of all of the offenses
within the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction.89  Schabas finds that some
exceptions to the mens rea standard have served to dilute it, and lists JCE as a
prime example.'90 Following the Judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg, guilt by
association is not criminalizable at international law and is specifically prohibited
by the ICTY.' 91 However, JCE arguably comes close to obviating the distinction
between doing crime (commission, under which JCE was articulated) and being
criminal (guilt by association).
JCE has evoked reams of criticism19 2 and has been formally passed over by
the ICC.'93 Yet JCE has historically enjoyed prominence at the ICTY194 because it
185. HART, supra note 182, at 90.
186. Id. Strict liability assigns culpability regardless of fault or responsibility: it is often applied to
situations found to be inherently dangerous. Id.
187. Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offenses, 12 CRIM. L.F. 291 (2001); William
Schabas, Mens Rea and The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1015, 1015 (2003).
188. Rome Statute, supra note 51, at art. 30.1.
189. Schabas, supra note 187, at 1025.
190. Id at 1033.
191. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 82-
83, 85 (Jan., 2005). In fact, it is specifically addressed as impermissible in the ICTY's Statute. Rep. of
the Secretary-General Pursuant to S.C. Res. 800, 1 2, S/25704, and l} 50-51 (May 3, 1993) .This was
reaffirmed in Prosecutor v. Stakid, Case No. IT-97-24, Judgement, 386 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006).
192. See e.g., Danner, supra note 191, at 137-38; Van der Wilt "Joint Criminal Enterprise and
Functional Perpetration" in Andre Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt (eds) SYSTEM CRIMINALITY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
193. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Criminal Confusion, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 406, 407-08 (2009).
However, the ICC's Art. 25 standard of "co-perpetration" is arguably the functional equivalent of JCE.
See id. at 414.
194. Id. at 407. As of this writing, there are strong indications that JCE's power as an irrefutable
instrument for the OTP may be waning. Beginning in 2012 with the Gotovina acquittal, several high-
ranking defendants have been acquitted under JCE charges. The high-ranking officials are Croatian
General Ante Gotovina, Commander of Croatian Special Police Mladen Marka6, and Croatian assistant
minister of defense Ivan l ermak; Serbian Generals Jovica Stanigid and Franko Simatovid; and Serbian
General Momtilo Perigi6. Gotovina Judgment, supra note 159; Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-
06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012);
Stanigid Judgement, supra note 170; Prosecutor v. Perigi6, Case No. IT-04-81, Judgment (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011); Prosecutor v. Perigi6, Case No. 1T-04-81, Appeals
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addresses a central ICL problem regarding how to link bad actors to bad actions,
especially where formal hierarchies of command are absent. One dogged critique
of JCE is that it amounts to strict liability for which, once charged, there is no
defense.195  Strict liability, though not prevalent in domestic criminal law, is
foundationally present at ICL, which defines crime in part based on the
characteristics of the victims. Unlawful killing which might be categorized as
murder or manslaughter in domestic criminal law, at ICL tums into a war crime, or
a crime against humanity, depending on the circumstances in which perpetrator
and victim find themselves, as well as certain immutable characteristics of the
victim.19 6  Thus, for the perpetrator of international crime, committing crime
assumes certain features of strict liability (where the crime is defined by the
identity or circumstance of the victim, and thereby outside of the particular malice
of the perpetrator).
For both Plavgi6 and Babid, charged with committing persecutions under the
theory that they knew of persecutions committed by their colleagues ("JCE I") or
that persecutions were reasonably foreseeable ("JCE III") based on their activities,
their intent is discerned either from their actual or reasonable knowledge. In
juridical terms, neither Chamber needs to speak to "intent" beyond "knowledge" or
"foreseeability," the elements required to substantiate JCE. In both cases, evidence
was offered that spoke to both defendants' actual or reasonable knowledge. 197 The
Plavgi Judgment, however, does not discuss Plavgid's intent qua motivation or
knowledge.'98 The Judgment references "intent" only once, in relation to the
gravity of the persecutions charge.'99 In this way, the Plavgie Chamber subsumes
any and all discussions of intent into the "gravity of the crime" of persecutions.200
The Babk Chamber, however, entitles an entire section of its judgment "Babir's
intent'.2°1 Moreover, the silence in Plavgi6 and focus in Babi6 lead directly to
Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013); Prosecutor v. Segelj,
Trial Chamber Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 31, 2016). In 2013, Judge
Harhoff of the ICTY circulated a semi-open letter accusing the ICTY Chief Judge Theodor Meron of
applying "tenacious pressure" on judges to tighten the standards required to convict military leaders
under JCE. ICTY Judge Frederik Harhoff's Email to 56 Contacts, BT.DK (June 6, 2013),
http://www.bt.dk/sites/default/files-dklnode-files/511/6/6511917-letter-english.pdf (on file with
BT.DK). Judge Harhoff was fired in response. Andy Wilcoxson, Lipstick on a Pig: Corrupt "'Justice "
at the ICTY, SERBIANNA (Oct. 22, 2013), http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/2437. See also Mia
Swart, Tadi6 Revisited. Some Critical Comments on the Legacy and the Legitimacy of the ICTY, 3
GOETTINGEN INT'L L. J. 985, 1009 (2011); Jelena Subotic, Legitimacy, Scope and Conflicting Claims
on the ICTY: In the Aftermath of Gotovina, Haradinaj and Perisic, 13:2 HUM. RTS. J. 170, 175 (May
28, 2014).
195. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-PT, Defense Final Trial Brief, In 148-152
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 27, 2010); see also Gotovina Judgment, supra note
159.
196. See George Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN L. 163 (2004) (discussing issues of collectivity at international criminal law).
197. Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1; Babi Sentencing Hearing, supra note
13.
198. Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4.
199. Id. 52.
200. ld.(finding it to be a "crime of utmost gravity").
201. Babid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, M 25-28.
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jurisprudential divergences in the two cases. In Plavi6, ducking the question of
Plavgi's intent (her evil intention) allowed the Chamber to focus on what it
characterizes as Plavgi's benevolent intention following the war, i.e. her role in
supporting the Dayton Accords. In Babik, a juridically unnecessary focus on
motivation allows the Chamber to morally condemn Babi6, thereby depriving his
case of didactic, political potential.
We begin in Plavgi, using the Judgment's characterization of Plav~id's
criminality as an example. In its submissions, through its witnesses, and in its
closing statement at Plavgir's hearing, the OTP described the horrific violence of
the war in Bosnia. The OTP positioned Plavgi6 as "one of the beacons" of that
violence, a politician who "imbued [others] with a mission to use criminal means
to achieve her vision of an ethnically separated Bosnia" i.e. to beat, rape, and kill
civilians.20 2 The OTP spoke to the "efficiency and ruthlessness of the campaign of
persecutions" as well as its scale.20 3 The OTP also noted that Plavgi6 "was one of
the leaders of the [ethnic cleansing] effort, and she embraced its goal and
supported it in various ways.'2 04 This description makes it clear that Plavgi6 had
real-time knowledge of crimes committed, and that she shared the evil intent of
those who perpetrated the crimes. The OTP's indictment (to which, again, Plavgi6
plead guilty) goes farther, defining her participation as including the planning,
instigating, and ordering of persecutions. 2
5
The Plavgi Judgment, however, subtly but importantly rewrites Plavgi's
participation. The Judgment lists the grave crimes as laid out in the Indictment, but
tweaks Plavgir's role. After reviewing the crimes as included in the Indictment,
the Judgment characterizes Plavgi6 as having "participated in the cover up of these
crimes by making public statements of denial for which she had no support-When
she subsequently had reason to know that these denials were in fact untrue, she did
not recant or correct them."20 6  The Judgment culls this information from the
"Factual Basis" filed together with Plavgir's Plea Agreement.20 7  Unlike the
Indictment, which is a public document articulating legal charges, the Factual
Basis is a confidential, ex parte document reciting facts, and it was first made
public on the date of Plavgi6's hearing.20 8 The significance of these distinctions is
that the indictment comprises the official record of Plavgir's crime which
effectively becomes an official record of her condemnation (together with the
Tribunal's judgment) once she pleads guilty. When the Indictment and the Factual
Basis cannot be reconciled, this presents a problem: first and foremost, a legal
problem for the Chamber, but ultimately also a historical and social problem for
those who would use ICTY judgments for larger societal purposes.
This is the case in Plavi, where the Judgment's characterization of Plavgir's
role, drawn from the Factual Basis, contravenes what the Judgment recognizes as
202. Dec. 18 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 23, at 630.
203. Id. at 623.
204. Id. at 630.
205. Plavti6 Indictment, supra note 4, 18.
206. Plavii6 Judgment, supra note 4, 17.
207. Plavti6 Factual Basis for Plea of Guilt, supra note 174,120.
208. Id.; Prosecutor v. Plavic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1S, Order for Release of Confidential
Document, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 16, 2002), http://icr.icty.org/.
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Plav i6's crime, which is having "planned, instigated, ordered and aided and
abetted persecutions of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb
populations of 37 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina."20 9  Intent is
problematically absent from the Judgment's descriptions of Plav~iC's role, because
such descriptions call into question Plavgi6's knowledge. Plavgi6 could hardly
plan, instigate, or order without knowledge. The Plavi6 Judgment suggests hat
Plavgi6 did not have real-time knowledge of the violence: consider the quote above
("[w]hen she subsequently had reason to know") 2t' as well as a later description:
"as a leader and later an accused, she learned a great deal about the gravity and
nature of the crimes committed by the forces which she led and inspired during the
war; and she recognizes her obligation to accept responsibility for acts committed
by others." 21 1 Here the Chamber follows Plavgir's own iteration; in her statement
addressing the Tribunal, Plavgi6 states that through the indictment and with the
help of her lawyers, conducting "our own investigation and evaluation" she has
"now come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent people
were the victims of an organised, systemic effort to remove Muslims and Croats
from the territory claimed by Serbs.212  These statements place Plav§i's
knowledge after the fact, which would challenge the Indictment's charge of
"planning, instigating, ordering" and thereby, arguably, the criminal charges
themselves.
The upswing of these machinations is that in Plavi6, the question of intent
with regard to her crimes is re-characterized as a question of intent regarding her
plea of guilt. This sleight-of-hand permits the Plavi6 Chamber to consider the
possible power of Plavgi 's admission of guilt under the category of intent, i.e. it
allows her admission of guilt, instead of remaining only a possible mitigating
factor at sentencing (discussed below), to wriggle into the construction of her
criminality itself This thus permits the Plav.i Chamber to turn its consideration
of her post-war conduct, which juridically can only exist as a mitigating
circumstance, into a consideration of Plav§iW~s motivation (which speaks to her
intent, and thereby, her criminality itself).
In its Sentencing Judgment, the Plavgie Chamber devotes fifteen paragraphs to
considering the value of Plavgir's remorse as a reconciliatory mechanism, and nine
paragraphs to the significance of her post-war conduct.213 Both of these categories
are properly understood as "mitigating" factors, where mitigation refers to the
length of the sentence. The Plavgi Judgment tips its hand, however, when it
begins its consideration of the "substantial" mitigating circumstances in the Plavgi6
case by discussing, "Mrs. Plavgit's... unprecedented steps to mitigate the crime
against humanity for which she is responsible."214 The problem here is that crimes
cannot be mitigated. Mitigating circumstances can alter the classification of a
crime: a murder charge (requiring premeditation) may be reduced to a lesser
209. Plavid Judgment, supra note 4, 8.
210. Id. 17 (emphasis added).
211. Id. 19 (emphasis added).
212. Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 1, at 609 (emphasis added).
213. Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4, 66-81,85-94.
214. Id 61 (emphasis added).
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charge,2 15 such as manslaughter, for example. In domestic criminal law, an
affirmative defense can defeat a charge even where true (where the crime is still
murder, but the justification of self-defense removes the punishment. Note that
affirmative defenses are not available at ICL due to the non-derogable nature of the
rights infringed by violations of international humanitarian law).2 16 One does not
mitigate the crime: rather, one mitigates punishment for a given crime or,
depending on the elements of the crime in question and the facts collected
regarding it, one reassigns criminal definition, sometimes through mitigating
circumstances. The Plavgi6 Judgment problematically conflates the categories of
criminality (intent, pertaining to crime's definition) and context (mitigation or
aggravation, pertaining to eventual sentence).
By contrast, the Babi6 Chamber pens an entire portion of its sentence under
the heading "Babir's intent.217 Because Babid cooperated so extensively with the
OTP, giving informational interviews as well as testifying in several other cases,
questions of BabiS's intent (both his motivation and his knowledge) are well
documented. The Babk Judgment notes that "Babi explained that as of August
1991 he shared the intent of others with whom he participated in planning the
campaign of persecutions to forcibly resettle the Croat and non-Serb populations
from the targeted areas.2 18  Babi6 admitted he knew of the mistreatment,
deportations, and destruction of property connected to the ethnic cleansing of
Krajina, and that he knew there was a possibility that murders might result, though
he was unaware at the time of the 200 killings that took place during this period.219
The Babi Chamber had so much information regarding Babir's intent that it
rejected Babir's initial plea of guilt as an aider and abettor of a JCE as
inadequate.220 Babi6 revised his plea to participating as a "co-perpetrator" of a
JCE, a more serious charge, which was in turn accepted by the Tribunal.221
In its Judgment, the Babi Chamber resists what it characterizes as the parties'
assessment that Babir's liability is "lessened by the fact that he did not intend the
commission of the murders as such but was merely aware that murders were being
committed as part of the JCE.' ,22 2 This reaction on the part of the Babie Chamber
is in line with JCE liability, which requires, in its most extreme form, mere
"knowledge of the foreseeability" of a crime.223 Moreover, and distinguished from
Plavgi6, the Chamber pushed back at attempts to allow factual elements only
considerable as mitigating (in terms of sentence) to encroach on questions of
215. See, e.g., People v. Morrin, 187 N.W.2d 434, 446, 453 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (where the
mitigating circumstances of heat of passion reversed a first degree murder charge).
216. See Adam B. Shniderman and Charles A. Smith, Towards Justice: Neuroscience and
Affirmative Defenses at The ICC, STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_ id=2275098&download=yes.
217. Babi Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 1125-28.
218. Id. 126.
219. Id. IM26-27.
220. Id. Ji 6-8.
221. Id. 8.
222. Id. 1138.
223. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 220 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
VOL. 44:2
RECONCILIATION THROUGH A JUDICIAL LENS
criminality themselves.224 Thus the Babi6 Judgment applied a standard criminal
justice rubric, fitting the facts of the case solidly into the doctrinal rubric
established by JCE case law.
The Babi6 Chamber was substantially aided by the OTP, which itself pushed
back against imprecise queries with curt, doctrinal summaries. In one example,
Judge Orie investigated facts from the factual statement, trying to ascertain what
sort of unlawful killings occurred against civilians:
Is this to be understood, that Mr. Babic was aware that civilians were
killed as collateral damage to justified military action? Or was-I
mean, you can kill-it sounds very horrible. But you can kill civilians
in two different ways; either by using wrong military equipment for an
attack not targeting precisely, and thus killing civilians as-not as
collateral damage but more or less as a consequence of improper
military action; and of course, you can also save the lives of the civilians
during the attack, and then kill them afterwards.
225
The OTP responded not to the question asked but instead placed Babir's
admissions into a doctrinal framework: "Mr. Babic was very clear saying it was
not legitimate military actions, but ethnic cleansing campaign in an attack that was
actually illegal. And in the course of this attack, civilians were killed. 226 Here the
OTP neatly reformulated Judge Orie's factual question into a legal category, and
then made this legal categorization synonymous with Babi6 factual submissions,
thereby making Babi6 the originator of the legal formulation.227
In summary, the two cases offer several contradictions. While the Babik
Chamber applied JCE relentlessly, it supported this application of the legal
standard with a (juridically unnecessary) discussion of BabiC's intent, which reads
like an insistence on his bad character. Meanwhile, the Plavgi Chamber
connected Plav~i 's intent to the gravity of the crime, which gravity it then
distanced from Plavgi6 by repeatedly considering her "lesser role" in the JCE. The
transformation of intent in the Plavgik Judgment from what is required under JCE
(knowledge or foreseeability) into what is characterized by the Judgment as
Plavgi's after the fact realization, allowed the Judgment to make Plav~id's plea of
guilt itself legally commensurate with furthering the work and purpose of the
224. Babid Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 179-180.
225. Id. at 179 11.17-25.
226. id. at 180 I1. 1-9.
227. Id. There is a storied history of asking defendants to provide not just facts but also law: the
ErdemoviW chamber required Erdemovid to categorize his crimes as either crimes against humanity or
war crimes, explaining to him that had there been a trial the OTP would have done this, but since he
was pleading guilty, he should do it himself. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-PT,
Transcript, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 31, 1996). The Appeals Chamber later
reversed the Trial Chamber in part because Erdemovi6, in choosing "crimes against humanity" which
was the more severe of the two charges, demonstrated he was not adequately informed. Prosecutor v.
Erdemovi6, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997).
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ICTY. 228 This is a central piece of the juridical puzzle that transforms the Plavi6
case into a didactic example modeling liberal values.
B. The Jurisprudence of Punishment: Distinct Formulations of
'Aggravation' and 'Mitigation' in Plavgi6 and Babi6
As demonstrated above, in the Plavi6 Judgment, elements of what juridically
should have been considered as contextual (going to mitigating circumstances
which might impact sentence length) were blurred by considerations of Plav§iW's
criminality as attached to her intent. The Babi6 Judgment, meanwhile, applied the
facts doctrinally. This section considers important distinctions in the two
Chambers' constructions of context, i.e. of mitigating and aggravating factors to be
considered in formulating the sentence.
Sentencing itself is only very broadly defined by the ICTY Statute,229 and
sentencing is notoriously irregular at the ICTY; each Trial Chambers is permitted
to largely construct its own rationale for the sentence it awards.230 In cases of plea
agreements, the OTP and the defense make sentencing recommendations, which
may or may not correspond. Such recommendations, agreed or not, do not bind
the Trial Chamber in any way; it remains entirely free to assign the sentence it
determines.23' The ICTY Rules note that aggravating and mitigating
circumstances may be taken under consideration during sentencing.3 2 The Rules
themselves define only one "mitigating" circumstance: "substantial cooperation"
with the Prosecution.233  ICTY practice has developed other aggravating and
mitigating factors that are often reiterated in later case law, though such
reiterations do not bind the ICTY as regards the specifics of sentence length.
The Plavgi6 Chamber engaged in a brief (eight-paragraph) consideration of
possible aggravating circumstances.34 This followed a lengthy summarization
(twenty-five paragraphs) of details from the prosecution witnesses called at the
hearing in order to conclude that the crime at issue was "of utmost gravity" and
occurred on a "massive scope".2 35 Following other ICTY cases, the Judgment
228. Prosecutor v. Plavi6, Case No. IT-00-39&40/l-S, Sentencing Judgment, 1 73 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003).
[llt may be argued that by her guilty plea, Mrs. Plavgi6 had already demonstrated
remorse... IT]here is a further and significant circumstance to be considered, namely the
role of the guilty plea of the accused in establishing the truth in relation to the crimes and
furthering reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
Id.
229. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Resolution 808 (1993), art. 24, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
230. Id.; Uwe Ewald, 'Predictably Irrational': International Sentencing and its Discourse against
the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on JCTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
365,(2010).
231. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, at Rule 24; Cassese 1998, supra note
28, at 11.
232. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, at Rule 101 (B) (i) - (ii).
233. Id. at Rule 101 (B) (ii).
234. Plavsi6 Judgment, supra note 4, I 53-60.
235. Id. 11127-52.
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necessarily noted that Plavgi4's leadership position was an aggravating
circumstance, which it immediately mitigated by asserting that Plavgi6 was not "in
the very first rank of leadership.,236  The tone and language, deferential and
apologetic, is in marked contrast to the Babi Chamber's construction of his
leadership as an aggravating circumstance.
The Plavgi6 Chamber next turned to mitigating circumstances, where it
recognized four: her guilty plea (in conjunction with what it said regarding her
remorse and what it offered in terms of reconciliation); her voluntary surrender;
her post-conflict conduct (specifically her assistance in implementing the Dayton
Accords) and her age.237 The Chamber attached "great weight" to Plavgi6's guilty
plea and post-conflict conduct, which it found to be "a formidable body of
mitigation.' '238 It ignored testimony regarding Plav§iW's ongoing nationalist beliefs
and exhortations, and dismissed discussion of her refusal to cooperate (finding that
a refusal to cooperation with the OTP could not constitute an "aggravating"
circumstance, but simply that her refusal to cooperate obviated the possibility that
"cooperation with the OTP" might count in mitigation towards her sentence.)239
This is significant because either of these elements might have influenced the
Tribunal's consideration of Plavgi 's post-conflict conduct.
The Babi Judgment determined that Babi 's crime was of "extreme gravity"
and was "characterized by ruthlessness and savagery".240 It determined his
leadership role was an aggravating factor, because his participation was
"substantial".24' The Judgment specified two main reasons for this finding: first,
as a leader Babid "enlisted the resources" at his disposal to further the JCE and
second, Babit's involvement "gained momentum over time" which "amplified its
consequences., 242 The Judgment hus rejected the parties' contentions that Babi 's
role in the JCE was limited, and that this should be considered in mitigation.
243
The Judgment accepted the parties other submissions regarding mitigation: Babid's
admission of guilt, his cooperation (for which the Judgement affords "substantial
mitigating weight"), his show of remorse, voluntary surrender, and personal nd
family circumstances.24
236. Id. 57. The entire argument reads:
The Trial Chamber accepts that the superior position of the accused is an aggravating factor
in the case. The accused was not in the very first rank of the leadership: others occupied that
position. She did not conceive the plan which led to this crime and had a lesser role in its
execution than others. Nonetheless, Mrs. Plavgid was in the Presidency, the highest civilian
body, during the campaign and encouraged and supported it by her participation in the
Presidency and her pronouncements.
Id.
237. Id. I 66-106.
238. Id. 110.
239. Plavgid Judgment, supra note 4, 110.
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Finally, and significantly, the BabiW Judgment rejected the parties' contention
that Babit's post-war conduct should count as mitigating.245 The Babi6 Chamber
offered the example of Plavgit's post-war conduct as a standard against which to
consider Babi: 246 such conduct included support for Dayton and the removal of
obstructionist officials from office. This presupposes, of course, that one is in a
political position capable of performing such acts: the standard would thus fail as
any kind of doctrinal gage. At the same time, the standard as articulated by the
Babi Chamber ignored the motivation for these acts which, as argued above, in
Plavgit's case were as easily construed as personal self-interest (remaining in
power) as ideological commitment. Finally, the Babi Judgment's conclusion on
this score ignored factual evidence presented at the Sentencing Hearing, which
evidence spoke to Babi's attempts to thwart violent objectives, often at grave
bodily risk to himself,247 as well as his work towards a political solution for
Krajina within Croatia as early as 1992, and again in 1995.248
In summary, the two cases diverge significantly in terms of how they structure
and weigh the construed aggravating and mitigating factors. In terms of
aggravation, Babi's leadership position was construed as a destructive force due
to its "power of inertia" while the destructive capacity of Plavgit's infamous
nationalist rhetoric was unaddressed. Plavgi 's leadership role was downplayed
whereas Babit's was amped up. But it is in the constructions of meaningful
mitigation that the two cases most importantly diverge, where the reconciliatory
capacity of Plavgit's plea of guilt, in a category invented by the Tribunal, through
witnesses sympathetic to the socially constitutive aims of the Tribunal,249 took on a
mitigating capacity large enough to mitigate her crime itself. Babi6, on the other
hand, had only a Tribunal functionary, the erstwhile Prosecutor Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff,
to speak for him regarding the importance of his cooperation.
C. Comparing & Contrasting Reconciliation Narratives in Plavi6 and Babi6
One of the values of the ICTY is to perform liberalism in the Balkans, to offer
an antidote to the dead-end of nationalist politics that tore Yugoslavia apart, and
which continues to threaten peace in its successor states. By this account, rule of
law processes are substituted for primordial, essentialist collectives as a means of
national organization. This is one of the "truths" the Tribunal is meant to
245. Id. 96.
246. Id. 1ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 92, at 94.
247. Two instances of personal harm to Babi6 were detailed in the Sentencing Hearing, both of
which were petulantly dismissed by Judge Orie. In a further irony, the risks that Plavgid took when she
defied her hardline colleagues in favor of the international community (risks for which she received
police and military protection from the international community) are described at length at the Plavti6
Sentencing Hearing, and elicit praise for her "courage." Id. I 67, 78, 85, 92-93, 124-25.
248. Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 24 (Factual Statement of U.S. Ambassador
Peter Galbraith in Milosevic case).
249. Madeleine Albright was the U.S.'s representative to the UN when the ICTY was created, and
her views on the possibility of the Tribunal acting to promote liberal values are well documented; Alex
Borraine, who spoke about reconciliation at Plavgi6's hearing, founded The International Center for
Transitional Justice; Elie Weisel, a Holocaust survivor, has written extensively regarding recognition
and victimbood.
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pronounce,25° a truth which might have, in the words of the Erdemovik Sentencing
Judgment, the potential to "cleanse the ethnic and religious hatreds and begin the
healing process.,251 This is a role that the Tribunal has often imagined for itself,
which role is referenced expressly in the Plav§iM hearing by the OTP in terms of
the "linked" concepts of accountability and reconciliation served by the
Tribunal,252 and noted by the Babi Chamber, in passing, as a benefit of his
253statement of remorse.
Both the Plavgi6 and Babi hearings and judgments speak to questions of
nationalism, liberalism, and reconciliation. As noted above, the judgments turn
common sense readings on their heads in this regard, turning an unapologetic
Serbian nationalist (Plavgi6) into a forward marching democratic liberal (and
thereby insisting that she remain a public figure, and perform as an example), and
condemning a bona fide repentant, reformed nationalist (Babi6) into a petty
attention-seeker (and thereby denying Babi6 a public role). In this vein, this
section closes by briefly contrasting the narrative arcs-the stories told-through
the PlaviF6 and Babk processes.
In her closing statement, Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte characterized Plavgi6 as
on a "path" or "trajectory" towards rule of law liberalism.2 54 Prosecutor Del Ponte
made this argument in spite of what she named as a stubborn refusal on Plav~i6's
part to cooperate in other cases before the Tribunal: Del Ponte refers to such (non-
existent) cooperation as "the last step of [Biljana Plavgi6's] journey."25 5  Some
250. See Akhavan, supra note 111.
251. MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY, I (Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (quoting Madeleine Albright).
252. Plavti6 Dec. 18 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 23, at 620; see also Plavti6 Dec.
16 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 176, at 376.
The parties to this litigation share the view that it is only through the establishment of truth
about what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the fragile and vital process of
reconciliation can begin. Furthermore, we agree that it is only through the establishment of
truth that the unhealthy shackles of revision that debilitate the former Yugoslavia and that
foster suspicion, ethnic hatred, and civil unrest can be broken.
Plavgi6 Dec. 16 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 176, at 376 II. 14-21.
253. Babid Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 11 53. The value of articulating remorse is
standard fare in plea bargain judgments; See Kerstin Carlson, Constructing Remorse as a Legal
Category: Plea Bargains at the ICTY, Presentation at the Law and Society Association Conference
(June 2015) (on file with author).
254. See Plavtid Dec. 18 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 23, at 636-37. Prosecutor
Carla Del Ponte further stated:
I have followed this file step by step. Mrs. Plavsic's guilty plea did not take us by surprise,
since it was nothing but a further step in her development since 1995, basically starting with
the Dayton Accords. During these days we have heard testimony dating back to this period.
It made it possible for us to understand that Dayton was, for her, the starting point of a new
development, of a new trajectory.... [S]ince Madam Plavsic started a new path by her guilty
plea, by admitting her personal criminal responsibility, and above all by accepting to pay the
price for her crimes before justice, in our submission the accused Plavsic should not only
enjoy mitigating factors but she should also have a reduced sentence.
Id. at 636 I1. 18-23, 637 I1. 9-13.
255. Id. at 637 II. 23-24.
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,,256have speculated that Plavgi6 "fooled" the ICTY with her "false repentance.
While this may be true, the trial transcript does not support such an interpretation.
Indeed, there were many instances where the Plavi Chamber was invited to
consider Plavgi6's actual beliefs and motivations beyond Plav§iW's lukewarm
statement of remorse (which referenced Serb victims as often as Muslim and Croat
victims) and which, as noted above, in its very form reiterated the kinds of
nationalist rationalizations that underwrote Bosnian brutality (largely, the "people"
as a collective body capable of honorable actions, and being shamed). Rather it
seems more likely that the Chamber decided to accept the Defense's injunction "to
consider the positive effects of [Plavgir's] guilty plea as the only political leader
willing to step forward and act responsibly for wrongs committed during the
war. '257  The more pressing question then concerns Babi6: why couldn't, or
wouldn't, the Babi6 Chamber, after receiving the narrative of a one-time political
leader stepping forward and actually claiming responsibility, accept the narrative
of liberal rehabilitation when it was presented?
In the Babi6 process, both the OTP and the Defense presented Babid's story as
that of a rehabilitated nationalist. In calling the witness Kova~evi6 to testify
regarding the political environment of fear and propaganda under which Serbs in
Croatia lived and the ways in which this made all information suspect for them, the
parties were iterating that Babi6:
Only became radicalised through moves of the political leaderships both
in Belgrade and Zagreb and a large-scale and sophisticated Serbian
media campaign to revive peoples' old fears and insecurities, leading to
separation of communities along ethnic lines and resulting in violence of
the dominant ethnic group against the others.
258
Over two days of testimony, the witness, Kovaevi6-who was himself a
former politician from Krajina, although he had worked in a multiethnic party-
tried to provide detailed information regarding the political and cultural climate of
fear and intimidation that prevailed in Krajina during the time Babi6 served in
office.259  He recounted details of Babir's personal experiences of violence,
including the murder of Babir's father-in-law by Croatian soldiers, who set fire to
houses in the village of Vrlika in 1991 (Babi6's house was burned down, and his
own mother narrowly escaped);260 he described an attempt on Babi6's life by
troops loyal to ethnic Serb interests. This considered and articulate testimony did
not reach the bench, however.
256. Mark B. Harmon and Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 683, 704 (2007); Julian A. Cook 111, Plea Bargaining at The Hague, 30 YALE J.
INT'L L. 473, 483 (2005);see also Drakulic, surpa note 126.
257. Plavgi6 Dec. 16 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 176, at 380 11.8-10.
258. Babi6 Sentencing Judgment, supra note 13, 71 90. This is significant because it is quoting the
Prosecution's Sentencing Brief 1 57 (arguing that Babir's prior character should be a mitigating factor
in judgment).
259. Prosecutor v. Babid, Case No. IT-03-72, Sentencing Hearing, at 130-58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/trans/en/040401SE.htm
[hereinafter Babi6 Apr. 1 Sentencing Hearing Transcript].
260. Id. at 144.
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One particular example of a determined witness and a deaf chamber is
illustrative: in 1992, after BabiI had broken with Milogevi6, he was attacked in his
home by Krajina police while meeting with SDS party members, and was badly
beaten and hospitalized as a result.26 1 Kova~eviI testified that the pro- MilogeviI
attackers "shouted insults at [Babi6]," and made specific mention of one particular
insult, a word which was initially translated as "prefect.,262  Distracted by
Kova~evir's "hearsay' 263 testimony, Judge Orie shut down this line of questioning
as "really entering the realm of speculation."264 What was nearly lost in the fracas
was the actual meaning of the insult shouted at Babi6. The word in question was
originally translated as "prefect," which an overwhelmed translator later replaced
with the original Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian word, "2upan," and which was finally
paraphrased by Defense counsel, in an aside, as "traitor." 265  It was only the
following day, when Kova~eviI was invited by the bench to revisit the term, that
he was permitted to explain its significance.266 "Zupan" refers to the head of an
administrative territory in Croatia.267 Thus this insult, when directed at Babi6,
implied that BabiI was a stooge, a Croatian stand-in, and a traitor to the Serbian
cause. Kova~eviI went on to testify that this term was used in pamphlets
distributed criticizing Babi6, and that Kova~evi6 had personally heard it used, both
during negotiations between political factions, as well as, incidentally, by Biljana
Plav~i6 in public addresses.
Throughout his testimony, Kova~evi6 tried to give accounts regarding which
officials (and from which entities) were present at which meetings, to show the
complexity of loyalties, and to give voice to the overwhelming atmosphere of fear
and uncertainty during the period.69 Yet Kova~evit, whose account reads as
reasoned and articulate, failed to reach his audience as a witness: he was repeatedly
interrupted, scolded, redirected, told to go faster or roughly instructed only to
answer the immediate question either by counsel or by the presiding judge.270 At
one point, Defense counsel began "cross-examining" him like a hostile witness
261. Id. at 149-50; see also SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 153.
262. Babi6 Apr. 1 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 259, at 150.
263. Kovadevi6 was testifying to exchanges he had not personally witnessed, which are
inadmissible as hearsay in some national jurisdictions. See generally FED. R. EvID. 801. However,
U.S. rules of evidence do not apply at the ICTY, and hearsay is admissible, as Judge Orie noted in the
very same breath: "[W]hat words were exactly used by the attackers if the witness has not been there, of
course, is hearsay. I'm not saying hearsay is not admissible in the Tribunal[.]" Id at 151 11. 5-7 (J.
Orie).
264. Id. at 148.
265. Id. at 150-52.
266. Babid Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 181-82.
267. Id.
The word Zupan, [sic] under the circumstances, meant traitor, a traitor of national interest
because its meaning derives from the fact that the Republic of Croatia determined its
territorial organisations by establishing counties as administrative units. And a Zupan [sic]
or a prefect is somebody who is the head of this administrative unit in Croatia.
Id. at 181 11.24-35, 172 I1, 1-4.
268. Babi Apr. 1 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 259, at 152-53.
269. Id. at 130-58.
270. Id. at 152.
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(regarding the precision of a date he'd given) until the presiding judge asked
counsel to stop.271  Kova~evir's testimony was repeatedly subjected to a rigorous
evidentiary standard inappropriate to the proceedings,272 where both witnesses
were appearing for the OTP and the defense, and where facts were "stipulated,"
meaning they were not in contention. This also set Kovaievid's testimony apart
from the other witness, Dr. Lon~ar, who testified to "facts" outside his realm of
expertise and for which, by his own admission, there was no scientific support.273
Furthermore, there is a very stark contrast between the reception and treatment of
Kova~evir's testimony and testimony made by witnesses at Plavgir's sentencing
hearing, where, for example, Elie Wiesel "testified" by video link, read a prepared
statement, and took no questions.2 74
More significantly, in terms of the capacity of the process to perform a
socially constitutive role, Kova~evir's testimony spoke to the formulation and
consequences of nationalist politics, and in this way followed the argument offered
by transitional justice advocates in terms of 'truths' the ICTY might promote.
275
The Babi Chamber was evidently interested in the social implications of Babid's
admission of guilt in other contexts, and the bench peppered Dr. Lon~ar with
questions about how Babid's "individualization of guilt" might impact other Serbs
who felt guilty (or whether Babi6 was being "scapegoated");276 whether taking
statements from victims was actually therapeutic;2 77 and what factors, external or
internal, might have "changed" Babi (into someone with extreme, nationalist
views).278  Yet with regard to Mr. Kova~evid's testimony concerning
271. Id. at 167.
272. See, e.g., Judge Orie's discount of "speculation" regarding the attack on Babi6:
I mean, this witness has testified that he heard from others, including Mr. Babic, that Mr.
Babic was attacked in his apartment, and I do not think that on the basis of his knowledge,
unless there is a good foundation for it, we could hear any further evidence in that respect.
Please proceed.
Id. at 14811. 14-18.
273. Dr. Lon~ar, who was qualified to speak to his experience treating trauma victims in Croatia,
also testified to the reception of Babid's admission of guilt:
I've talked mostly to Serbs from urban areas, but I also had contacts with Serbs who have
returned to their homes. This work was done in mixed villages, mostly in Banovina area. I
went to those villages. I talked to people of Serb ethnicity there. What I can say, and let me
repeat once again that no official statistics was done. There was no official record-taking or
research, so this is all a result of the exchanges in these interviews, but what I can say is that
I have not met any Serbs who had a negative attitude towards the admission of guilt of Mr.
Babic. What I also noticed among Serbs in Croatia is that there was a certain feeling of relief
among them. The admission of guilt of Mr. Babic and the message that it sent was that we
should focus on universal human emotions and treat it as such. This led to the fact that the
Serbs do not feel a collective guilt now but, rather, this guilt has been individualised and
attributed to a person.
Babi, Apr. 1 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 259, at 112.
274. Plavgi6 Dec. 16 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 176, at 455-61.
275. See Akhavan, supra note 111.
276. Babi6 Apr. 1 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 259, at 116 (Judge El Mahdi).
277. Id. at 118 (Judge Orie requesting a reading list on the topic).
278. Id. at 121-25 (Judge Oie). This exchange is perhaps the most problematic, as the witness is
asked to opine on what impacted Babi6, even though the witness does not know Babi. Dr. Lon~ar
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circumstantial pressures and contexts, the Trial Chamber's dismissal of this line of
argument was complete: it did not reference Kova~evi's testimony even once in
its judgment.279
In closing arguments, the Babie defense counsel specifically invited the
Tribunal to contrast Babi6 and Plavgi&.280 Babi6's defense counsel was seemingly
trying to consider the nationalist motivations, and later redemptions, of both
defendants, as a way of addressing the Tribunal's larger, to some extent unofficial,
reconciliation mandate. To this end, Babi6's Defense reminded the Chamber to
consider public statements regarding nationalist rhetoric and "the fuel [they] fed to
the fire," and invited comparison with Plav~i6, saying, "She said horrible, horrible
things, racist things, ugly things."281 Counsel continued, "You ask the Prosecution
to provide you with the worst of what Mr. Babi6 said ... So that if that is a
legitimate mitigating factor.., it should weigh more heavily in his favour, the
nature of what was said.,282 Despite floundering through the legal categories,
Babit's Counsel nevertheless tried to hold the substance of the comparison:
With respect to [Plavgi's and Babi6's] role, various degrees of
responsibility, in paragraph I of the Plavsic [sic] judgment, the Court
found that she embraced and supported the objective of ethnic
cleansing. I guess Mr. Babic did, but not in exactly the same way and
under the same circumstances. And I don't [know] how to articulate
that any better, but I think that the Tribunal ought to have a sense of
that at this point.
283
Defense counsel's plea for the Tribunal to "have a sense" is precisely what was
lost (a loss that is clearly felt), in these judgments.
D. Tying Plavgi6 and Babie to 1CL 's Legitimizing Discourse
This article has argued that the Plavgi6 and Babi cases are meaningfully
divergent and cannot be reconciled, particularly as regards the role the ICTY is
meant to play in social reconstruction, and the significance of defendant
cooperation with respect to that role. Does the article get it right? There are many
distinctions between the Plavgi6 and Babi cases, any of which undoubtedly
influenced the Chambers' deliberations and judgments. Biljana Plavgi6 came first
in time and was a bonafide public figure whose plea represented a change of heart
(as regards fighting the charges) after nearly two years of defying the Tribunal;
Milan Babi6 was an unemployed refugee in Serbia who prostrated himself before
the Tribunal before even being indicted. The Plavgi Sentencing Hearing was an
international event, attended by some of the top names and key players in the
nevertheless, albeit cautiously, opined that propaganda turned Babid into an extremist.
279. The only reference the Judgment makes to Kova~evid is descriptive, noting he testified "about
Babi's personality and positions at the time of the commission of the crimes." Babid Sentencing
Judgment, supra note 13, 13 n. 15.
280. Babid Apr. 2 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note 3, at 192
281. Id. at24211.13-14.
282. Id. at 242 II. 14-19.
283. Id. at 242 II. 3-8 (emphasis added).
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rarified world of transitional justice and public diplomacy,284 and this would have
added glamour and historical import to the proceedings; Babi's sentencing
hearing featured only two witnesses, both private individuals from the former
Yugoslavia decidedly devoid of glitz. Defense counsel, and even the bench, in the
Plavgi6 hearing appeared more organized, thoughtful, and attentive than their
counterparts in the Babi6 Chamber.2 85 In the Babi6 process, Babi's strongest
proponent at all times was the prosecutor, whose strongest loyalty, in turn, was to
Tribunal doctrine.
Realists like Jeremy Rabkin286 might argue that he Plavik and Babic cases
prove nothing further than the political impetus fueling ICL: Plavgi6 was useful to
the international community as a model, Babi6 was not, and there is little more
explanation required. Under this account, one might also note that the ICTY
needed to justify itself and its practice in relation to Plavgi6 precisely because she
was an infamous public figure and much was at stake. Yet if ICL (and law
generally) should be read as politics (i.e. interest) by another name, this does not
answer the query as to why the rationales offered through the two judgments are so
divergent. Why the distinctions in terms of their criminal charges (intent), and the
varied applications of aggravating and mitigating circumstances? Law's
legitimacy derives from its distinction from politics: why risk muting that
distinction through a muted doctrinal consideration? Realist explanations cannot
adequately respond to diverging rationales, offered by careful and invested
doctrinal professionals, in the Plavgi6 and Babi6 cases.
In another vein, in a recent article, Saira Mohamed tries to marry the
conflicting rationales of ICL through a theory she terms "aspirational
expressivism.' '287 Mohamed argues that because international criminal tribunals
are sites of storytelling (the narrative value espoused by Shklar, and adopted by
proponents of transitional justice), they provide ideal sites to set forth aspirations
for human behavior, which is, she argues, what legitimizes criminal law.
288
Mohamed sets out to answer the paradox that domestic criminal law addresses
deviance, but that international criminal law often adjudicates acts that are not
deviant, because they represent a new social norm, or because they are represent
responses that any normal person would have if subjected to the same
284. Plavgid Dec. 17 Sentencing Hearing Transcript, supra note I (including Elie Wiesel,
Madeleine Albright, Richard Goldstone).
285. For example, Plavgid's counsel seems to have succeeded, in his opening and closing
addresses, in constructing the intellectual approach the bench followed in its sentencing judgment. One
of Babid's lawyers, by contrast, made his closing statement extemporaneously: "Your Honour, I have
not written a speech. I'm more used to working from notes and speaking rather extemporaneously, so
that I cannot tell you [how long the intervention will be]. I have not timed it." Id. at 189 11. 2-4. This
rambling, disjointed intervention addressed the question of "how crimes against humanity can occur,"
Id. at 234, and likely damaged Babu's case by attempting to compare him to the "sham" of remorse
offered by Biljana Plavtid. Id. at 241-44.
286. Jeremy Rabkin, No Substitute for Sovereignty: Why International Criminal Justice has a
Bleak Future - and Deserves It, in ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE (William A. Schabas et al. eds., 2007).
287. Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity
and the Criminal, 124 YALE L. J. 1628, 1674-76 (2015).
288. Id. at 1633.
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circumstances.289 Thus for Mohamed, the diverging rationales offered in the
Plavgi6 and Babi are not irreconcilable, but rather meet as criminal justice
processes are put in service to didactic aims (her 'aspirational expressionism').
As with realist explanations, however, Mohamed's theory fits Plavgi, but
cannot explain Babi6. Babid seems to have made the journey ICL aspires to
express: from nationalist mouthpiece to remorseful humanitarian, Babi6's
trajectory is an example of the very truths that transitional justice theory advocates
as advantageous and essential. Where Plavgi 's story tells none of the abstract
truths 'judicial romanticism' presages for international criminal tribunals,
290
Babi6's story illustrates many of them.
Proponents of international criminal tribunals as transitional justice
mechanisms argue that trying individual criminal cases can have wide social
benefits.291 Such benefits arguably extend to teaching respect for the rule of law,
reconstructing divided societies, and enabling peace. Although this school is
contemporaneously referred to as "judicial romanticism" it has deep theoretical
roots reaching at least as far back as the work of Hart, Raz, and Dworkin, all of
whom advocated law's capacity to articulate, and construct, social and moral
norms.292 Moreover, given the steep price tag that international criminal tribunals
carry, and their fragile existence outside the power structure of any particular state,
there is pressure to justify such tribunals' efficacy in sweeping terms. Here we
find the Plavgi case, where Biljana Plavgi6 is a vehicle for demonstrating western
liberalisms triumph over nationalism, a didactic "preaching" in the tradition of
Shklar's argument for the value of political trials.
Other defenders of ICL, however, insist that ICL cannot and should not be
assessed outside of its own careful application and articulation of recognized legal
norms.293 This positivist school assesses ICL jurisprudence in terms of its own
substance, and rejects any wider social measurement o evaluate ICL legitimacy.
294
Here morality is protected through consistent, constant application of norms. Here
we find Babid, a vehicle for punishment through a strict criminal justice
formulation to his process.
V. CONCLUSION: SOUNDING A WARNING THROUGH PLA VSIC AND BABIe
This article has argued that distinctions in judicial reasoning and outcome in
the Plavgi6 and Babi6 cases illustrate diverging, and conflicting, rationales for the
legitimacy of international criminal law. But we might query, do these differences
matter? If two Balkan leaders were incongruously handled, or sentenced, what
impact does that ultimately have on the practice of ICL? The ICTY is universally
289. Id. See also Drumbl, supra note 72; Alette Smeulers, Punishing the Enemies ofAll Mankind,
21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 971, 973-74, 976-81 (2008); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of
International Criminal Law, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 561, 573-75 (2002).
290. See Akhavan, supra note I I1.
291. See, e.g., Cassese 1998, supra note 28, at 9-10.
292. HLA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY [ 1979] 2009; RONALD DWORKIN LAW'S EMPIRE 1988.
293. See Megret
294. See Fuller, supra note 57; HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL (1964).
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unpopular among its Balkan audiences, and there is no data that indicates that
Babir's heartfelt plea for tolerance in the face of nationalism mattered one whit
more, or less, than Plavgi 's lukewarm endorsement of Western liberal policies.
The process of plea bargaining itself would appear to be confusing and foreign to a
Balkan audience, which audience already overwhelmingly ignores material
produced by the ICTY, gleaning its information regarding war crimes prosecutions
largely from local media.295 What import, then, a close reading of the two cases?
There are few social spaces where words are asked to "do" more than at law.296
Thus although one can formulate distinctions between the Plavgi6 and Babi6 cases
in political or circumstantial terms (the vastly different political fortunes of the two
defendants; the benefits Plavgi6 enjoyed by 'coming first'; the influx of guilty
pleas just before Babi6; the make-up of the two trial chambers), this article takes as
its focus the language employed in resolving the two cases. It is this article's
contention that the language of the judgments, when considered in conjunction
with the language and arguments offered during the sentencing hearings, opens a
space to consider how ICL's articulations regarding the centrality of intention
impacts international criminal tribunals' socially constitutive capacity. Thus this
article takes as its starting point that the actual, precise discourse emerging from
the ICTY, in this case hearing transcripts and judgments, is representative of
institutional deliberation, and meaningful.
More centrally, the article has closely contrasted two similar cases to
demonstrate a generalizable divergence in ICL. ICL is simultaneously legitimized
as absolute protection for non-derrogable rights and as a means of social control
via criminal justice. This article argues that Plavgi and Babie demonstrate
unresolved challenges to the legitimacy of ICL which, if left unaddressed, threaten
the enterprise more fundamentally. Can the legitimacy of a court be separated
from its objective findings? Can a non-respected court produce meaningful
narratives? ICL remains susceptible to the challenge identified by Koskenniemi in
his now classic article,297 where he notes the thin line between punishing violations
of law, versus punishing what can come to be seen, retroactively, as bad political
decisions. Proponents of liberalism hold rule of law as a method or a process for
producing rights-respecting state institutions. In the divergences between the
Plav~i6 and Babik Judgments, we see the juxtaposition of rule-of-law processes
with rule-of-law outcomes. Only the first is a meaningful category capable of
delivering on law's socially constitutive potential.
295. See, e.g., OSCE, SURVEY ON MEDIA, MEDIA FREEDOMS AND DEMOCRACY IN MONTENEGRO
(2011).
296 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1955).
297. Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1
(2002) (critiquing criminalization of what might also be called political mistakes wherein victors
imposing a dominant narrative).
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